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REPLACING POLITICS WITH DEMOCRACY: 
A PROPOSAL FOR COMMUNITY PLANNING 
IN NEW YORK CITY AND BEYOND 
Amy Widman* 
INTRODUCTION 
Once an active port providing jobs for many New Yorkers, 
Brooklyn’s waterfront fell into disuse during the second half of 
the twentieth century as the city’s economy came to rely more 
heavily on roads for shipping. Miles of shoreline fell into 
neglect, leaving disrepair and environmental hazards. 
Revitalization of the waterfront entered the city’s agenda in the 
1990s, but the resulting plans lacked vision and varied widely 
from one neighborhood to another. Some of the largest swaths of 
waterfront were completely left out of the revitalization process 
by city leaders and private developers who lacked political and 
financial incentive to work with certain local communities. This 
selective approach to revitalization placed an unequal burden on 
those communities and denied them a voice in important 
decisions regarding the delicate balance of environmental clean-
up, cultivation of green space and protection of active industry 
and jobs. 
                                                          
 * Law clerk to the Hon. Theodore H. Katz, U.S. Magistrate Judge, in the 
Southern District of New York. J.D., cum laude, New York University, 2002; 
B.A., Northwestern University, 1996. The author would like to thank 
Professor Vicki Been, the editorial staff of the Journal of Law and Policy and 
all those involved in community planning in Brooklyn who took the time to 
speak with the author about the practices and procedures of an informal 
process. She also would like to thank her friends and family, especially Dan, 
for their love and support. 
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This article tells two stories of community planning in 
Brooklyn to illustrate possible reasons for the divergent 
development of the waterfront and suggests ways in which local 
communities can be involved. It offers public participation as a 
solution to disparate treatment and examines whether the 
comprehensive planning process lives up to its ideal as a method 
of public participation. Part I provides a background to the 
debate and theoretical discussions underlying community 
planning. Part II explores the value of public participation in land 
use decision making. Part III chronicles the history of 
community-sponsored planning in New York City. Part IV sets 
forth two case studies of recent attempts to rezone neighborhoods 
through community-sponsored plans. The two communities 
studied, Vinegar Hill and Greenpoint, are located within a few 
miles of each other along the East River in Brooklyn. They share 
a common industrial past, and many manufacturing buildings still 
dot their waterfronts. The neighborhoods differ greatly in size, 
demographics and, most significantly for this analysis, 
experience with the land use decision-making process. Part V 
applies the two case studies to identify which factors help or 
hinder a community in its efforts to draft a comprehensive plan. 
Part VI explores policies that equalize the necessary resources 
and negotiating power among communities, encouraging more 
diverse public participation in land use decision making. Part VII 
proposes a legislative change that would reward communities for 
their planning efforts and encourage inclusive processes. Finally, 
this article concludes with a call to reevaluate the current land 
use decision-making process with the objective of including 
residents and workers in the process in a meaningful way. 
The focus on New York City both grounds and restricts this 
article. The case studies are local in nature, and a comparison of 
only two experiences has inherent limitations. The diversity and 
density of Brooklyn, however, makes it a prime subject for 
examining how the land use process actually affects residents, 
and how failures of public participation occurs. Brooklyn’s 
diverse population requires consensus-building strategies, and its 
population density is integrally related to its problem of scarce 
resources. While the local government structure of New York 
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City may not mirror other jurisdictions, the purpose of this 
analysis is to explore how land use regulation can incorporate a 
real commitment to public participation by allowing and 
encouraging all communities to play an active role in the 
development strategies of their neighborhoods. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A controversy exists among planners, lawyers, policy makers 
and community leaders about how to formulate land use 
decisions. This dispute pits urban economics and democracy 
against one another as, at best, incompatible. Urban economists 
favoring a cost-benefit approach to land use decision making 
argue that this methodology is more efficient than focusing on 
public interest concerns because, at bottom, the primary social 
good is economic efficiency, not subjective notions of values.1 
These scholars contend that public participation itself is 
inefficient.2 
                                                          
1 See Frank I. Michelman, Political Markets and Community Self-
Determination: Competing Judicial Models of Local Government Legitimacy, 
53 IND. L.J. 145, 148-53 (1977-78) (comparing the economic or public choice 
model with the opposed public interest model of local government legitimacy); 
see also Shi-Ling Hsu & John Loomis, A Defense of Cost-Benefit Analysis for 
Natural Resource Policy, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. 10239 (2002) (asserting that 
cost-benefit analysis is a better tool for decision making than the alternatives); 
David M. Driesen, The Societal Cost of Environmental Regulation: Beyond 
Administrative Cost-Benefit Analysis, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 545 (1997) (providing 
background for cost-benefit analysis and questioning whether cost-benefit 
criteria has a coherent and compelling rationale); Courtney Harrington, Penn 
Central to Palazzolo: Regulatory Takings Decisions and Their Implications for 
the Future of Environmental Regulation, 15 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 383, 401 
(2002) (discussing the trend towards public policy to deal with conflicting 
social and legal interests associated with urban development). 
2 See NELSON M. ROSENBAUM, Citizen Participation and Democratic 
Theory, in CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN AMERICA 43 (Stuart Langton, ed., 1978) 
(noting that public participation is costly and can result in lackluster solutions 
in order to accommodate all views); see also Hanoch Dagan, Takings and 
Distributive Justice, 85 VA. L. REV. 741, 777 (1999) (arguing that public 
interests should not be followed to “protect members of our local communities 
from various forms of abuse”); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Uneasy Case for 
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Public interest advocates respond that economic equations do 
not encourage democracy, and restricting policy guidance to 
economic factors limits the options available to decision makers. 
These theorists argue that land use decisions are ethical in nature, 
and economics should not play any role.3 This argument is 
commonly based on recognition of the deleterious and 
undemocratic effects that asymmetrical market forces have on 
land use.4 
Direct democracy is sometimes touted as a tool for public 
participation in land use decision making. Advocates of direct 
democracy argue that participation through initiative and 
referenda encourages accountability and government 
responsiveness.5 Critics claim that this so-called ballot box 
                                                          
Devolution of the Individual Income Tax, 85 IOWA L. REV. 907, 939 (2000) 
(discussing Nelson M. Rosenbaum’s perspective that public participation 
“itself is neither rewarding nor conducive to the growth of strong community 
bonds”); Adam N. Bram, Public Participation Provisions Need Not Contribute 
to Environmental Injustice, 5 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 145, 158 
(1996) (discussing skeptics’ views that public participation is inefficient 
because it is expensive, hinders implementation of decisions, and relies on 
decision making by the public, whose ability to make complex decisions is 
questionable). 
3 See Nancy Perkins Spyke, Public Participation in Environmental 
Decisionmaking at the New Millennium: Structuring New Spheres of Public 
Influence, 26 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 263, 294-95 (1999); see also John 
W. Ragsdale, Jr., Some Philosophical, Political and Legal Implications of 
American Archeological and Anthropological Theory, 70 UMKC L. REV. 1, 
16 n.78 (2001) (stating that “the thought that economics should determine land 
use undermines the ethical and scientific principles of ecological rationality”); 
John Arntz, Prairie Wetlands: A Reflection of Why We Need a Land Ethic, 1 
GREAT PLAINS NAT. RES. J. 193, 204 (1996) (noting that “[c]ost-benefit 
analysis has acquired a negative reputation regarding land uses and our 
ecosystems because ecological processes are difficult to evaluate monetarily”). 
4 See JAMES C. SCOTT, SEEING LIKE A STATE: HOW CERTAIN SCHEMES 
TO IMPROVE THE HUMAN CONDITION HAVE FAILED 142-43, n.104 (1998) 
(noting that “in the absence of extensive planning in a liberal economy, the 
asymmetrical market forces which shape the city are hardly democratic.”). 
5 See, e.g., THOMAS E. CRONIN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS OF 
INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM, AND RECALL 10-11 (1989) (stating that if voters 
become frustrated with the decisions of politicians and administrative agencies, 
a populist democracy will allow the people to make the desired law and this, 
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zoning suffers from too much majoritarian public participation. 
Other scholars worry that direct democracy has no safeguards for 
capture by special interest groups.6 Other critics of direct 
democracy argue that lack of information and expertise causes 
citizens to make poor planning decisions.7 Both capture by 
special interest groups and lack of information can increase the 
prevalence of discriminatory measures that disadvantage the 
under-represented.8 
                                                          
in turn, will encourage officials to extend greater deference to the voice of the 
people); see also CITIZENS AS LEGISLATORS: DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN THE 
UNITED STATES (Shaun Bowler, Todd Donavan & Caroline J. Tolbert eds.) 
(1998) (examining whether the goals of direct democracy, providing voting 
mechanisms that allow citizens to get around legislators biased in favor of the 
wealthy and making politicians more responsive to the public will have been 
achieved); M. DANE WATERS, THE BATTLE OVER CITIZEN LAWMAKING 
(2001) (discussing the initiative process as a mechanism for influencing public 
policy at all levels of government). 
6 See, e.g., DAVID B. MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION: VOTING ON 
BALLOT PROPOSITIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 145-51, 182, 198-99 (1984) 
(stating that special interest groups may frequently veto initiatives and that 
they are heavily involved in the referendum process since there is a direct 
correlation between greater expenditures and ballot proposition victories); 
CRONIN, supra note 5, at 198-99 (noting that large, organized groups and 
those groups that can raise vast sums of money are better situated to win, and 
even more so, to block, any ballot box measures); WATERS, supra note 5, at 
59 (discussing the historical role of special interest groups in referendum and 
initiative ballot contests and analyzing the impact these well-funded groups 
have on campaign wins). 
7 See generally MAGLEBY, supra note 6, at 127-44. 
8 See, e.g., David L. Callies et al., Ballot Box Zoning: Initiative, 
Referendum and the Law, 39 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 53, 94-95 
(1991) (stating that “one of the most potentially troublesome problems with 
initiative and referendum is their tendency to dilute minority rights whether or 
not direct discrimination is intended”); John F. Niblock, Anti-Gay Initiatives: 
A Call for Heightened Judicial Scrutiny, 41 UCLA L. REV. 153, 189 (1993) 
(noting that initiatives and referendums can be a means to direct “bigotry, 
discrimination and prejudice” especially when they deal with the rights 
minority groups); Derrick A. Bell, Jr., The Referendum: Democracy’s Barrier 
to Racial Equality, 54 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1978) (explaining that racial 
minorities, fueled by frustration with their elected representatives, turned to 
“do-it-yourself” government using referenda to reject existing laws and enact 
new laws). 
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Nonetheless, New York City and its communities can use 
public participation as a planning tool to reconcile land use 
decisions with the democratic process. Advocates of public 
participation cite to the virtues of accountability, community and 
consensus building and the social efficiency engendered by 
informal debates and discussions that take place throughout the 
planning process.9 This article draws on that model of public 
participation, and argues that the public should have a more 
prominent voice in land use decisions. The city should reward 
public participation by adopting community-sponsored plans that 
evince concern for achieving harmony between environmental, 
economic and social factors—a balance that can be achieved only 
through an inclusive process. 
II. PUBLIC PARTICIPATION 
Public participation means many things; for purposes of this 
article the term refers to a change in process that improves 
democracy by fostering inclusiveness. If decision makers yield to 
public desires after an inclusive process, redistribution of power 
back into the hands of the people is possible.10 Effective 
participation can be achieved through education, access to useful 
information, meaningful interaction with government officials 
                                                          
 9 See, e.g., Carol Rose, The Ancient Constitution vs. The Federalist 
Empire: Anti-Federalism From the Attack on “Monarchism” to Modern 
Localism, 84 N.W. U. L. REV. 74, 96-97 (1989) (citing the virtues of 
“possibilities for constituent contact and civic participation” in local 
government as “structural restraints” on political power); Peter W. Salsich, 
Jr., Grassroots Consensus Building and Collaborative Planning, 3 WASH. U. 
J. L. & POL’Y 709, 712 (2000) (commenting that collaborative planning 
allows for residents to have a stake in the outcome of decisions and is an 
effective technique for information transfer). 
10 See MARY GRISEZ KWEIT & ROBERT W. KWEIT, IMPLEMENTING 
CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN A BUREAUCRATIC SOCIETY: A CONTINGENCY 
APPROACH 31 (1981); see also Tom Angotti, Race, Place and Waste: 
Community Planning in New York City, NEW VILLAGE, available at 
http://www.newvillage.net/ angotti.pdf (1999) (noting that public participation 
in planning goes back to the 1930s, when tenant actions in New York City 
created rent control). 
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and open dialogue.11 Although the passage of the Administrative 
Procedure Act drafted a form of public participation into 
administrative decision making,12 this codification focuses 
exclusively on public hearings to insure that individual opinions 
are heard and merely brings views into the open at the decision-
making stage.13 This inherently lacks focus on consensus 
building, and tends to polarize viewpoints at a juncture when 
only one view can ultimately prevail. 
Meaningful public participation focuses on the process, rather 
than the ultimate decision. This article applies a process-oriented 
model to the case studies described herein and suggests 
legislative change that would reward consensus-building 
                                                          
11 See generally Paul Wilkinson, Public Participation in Environmental 
Management: A Case Study, 16 NAT. RESOURCES J. 117, 119 (1976) 
(explaining open planning’s use of education, review, and dialogue as an 
integral part of the planning and decision-making process). 
12 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (2002). The Federal Administrative 
Procedure Act provides, generally, for public participation in administrative 
decision-making process through the use of a public hearing. Id. 
13 See generally Spyke, supra note 3, at 269 (noting that public 
participation in governmental decision making emerged after passage of the 
Administrative Procedures Act, which formalized public participation at the 
federal level). In time, governmental agencies offered educational programs to 
the public, published news releases about their activities, and hired experts to 
develop participation programs, all in an effort to open the decision-making 
process to the public. Id. See also Marco Verweij, Why is the River Rhine 
Cleaner than the Great Lakes (Despite Looser Regulation)?, 34 LAW & SOC’Y 
REV. 1007 (2000) (discussing the Administrative Procedures Act and its role 
in requiring federal agencies to seek public participation before enacting new 
water protection policies); Michael I. Jeffery, Intervenor Funding as the Key 
to Effective Citizen Participation in Environmental Decision-Making: Putting 
the People Back into the Picture, 19 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 643, 649 
(2002) (discussing the Administrative Procedures Act’s expansion of public 
notice and opportunity to obtain access to agency policies and decisions for 
inspection, participate in adjudication, and comment in national environmental 
rulemaking); Jim Rossi, Thirty-First Annual Administrative Law Issue: Politics 
and Policy: Presidential Administrations and Administrative Law: Bargaining 
in the Shadow of Administrative Procedure: The Public Interest in Rulemaking 
Settlement, 51 DUKE L.J. 1015, 1020-21 (2001) (comparing the inadequacies 
of the notice and comment rulemaking process underlying the Administrative 
Procedures Act with a consensus-based negotiated regulation). 
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participatory procedures. Inclusion of all community residents 
provides exposure to a healthy mix of perspectives, improving 
the decision-making process.14 This benefits the city by insuring 
fully informed decisions, and greater legitimacy and acceptance 
of decisions by the local population.15 The process itself also 
benefits communities by empowering residents and creating 
leaders.16 
Critics of extensive participation at the policy stage cite the 
deleterious result to administrative goals of efficiency, expertise 
and control.17 Agencies such as the City Planning Commission 
may criticize extensive public participation because it drains city 
resources. Indeed, public participation can be inefficient in 
economic terms.18 The challenge, then, is to devise a process that 
                                                          
14 See Spyke, supra note 3, at 267-68. Spyke notes that “[b]ecause 
government is derived from the people, all citizens have a right to influence 
governmental decisions, and the government should respond to them. 
Widespread participation exposes decisionmakers to a healthy mix of 
perspectives, which is believed to improve the decisionmaking process.” 
(citations omitted). Id. 
15 Id. at 271. (noting that agencies that engage in participation programs 
“strive to exchange information with the public, deal with diverse groups 
within the community, demonstrate a responsiveness to public concerns, and 
ultimately gain public acceptance of their decisions.”) 
16 Id. at 301. Spyke notes that “[t]oday, public participation increasingly 
is viewed not merely as a method by which well-informed decisions can be 
reached, but also a way to empower communities and create community 
leaders.” Id. She further posits that “[t]he sense of efficacy that accompanies 
this empowerment, that arises when involved citizens see their participation 
activities as part of a ‘larger whole,’ is a secondary end-product that is taking 
on greater significance.” Id. (citations omitted). 
17 Id. at 273. (noting that public participation’s “emphasis on the 
individual and direct access to decisionmakers conflicts with collectivist theory 
and republicanism. It also undermines the administrative goals of efficiency 
expertise, and control”). 
18 See id. (“On a more practical level, public participation is inefficient in 
terms of cost and time”). Admittedly, the money required for education, 
outreach, and meetings may seem burdensome for a process that is not 
guaranteed to produce results. See infra Part IV.B (discussing the fact that 
access to resources is both a costly and necessary element of informed 
planning decisions). See also Interview with Eva Handhart, Director of 
Municipal Art Society’s Planning Center, in New York, N.Y. (Oct. 19, 2000) 
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is consistent in its reliance on public participation without 
stripping agencies of all their resources. 
Encouraging vulnerable communities to take an active role in 
the planning and zoning decisions affecting their neighborhoods 
may seem elementary, but the case studies below reveal myriad 
organizational stumbling blocks and political process failures that 
result from subtle forms of discrimination. These studies also 
reveal a potential downfall of community planning: it is not 
successful unless the city has independent reasons to assist 
communities with planning. Whether due to economic, political 
or social concerns, the Department of City Planning does not 
give enough respect to the process of community planning.19 
Where a low-income community has undergone years of 
organizational struggle to transform an inclusive consensus-
building process into a community plan, the department no longer 
has an excuse to favor communities that are more politically 
influential.20 Lack of respect for such plans may, therefore, 
                                                          
[hereinafter Handhart Interview] [transcript on file with author] (stating that 
prior to receiving technical assistance from the Pratt Institute, Greenpoint’s 
planning efforts were hindered by communication breakdowns, financial 
constraints and rifts between renters, homeowners and various ethnic groups). 
19 See infra Part III (noting that the Commission weakened the potential 
impact of amendments to the City Charter by officially interpreting community 
plans as nonbinding policy guidelines). Relegating community-sponsored plans 
to nonbinding policy guides arguably illustrates lack of respect for the plans. 
20 See generally Adam D. Schwartz, The Law of Environmental Justice: A 
Research Pathfinder, 25 ENVTL. L. REP. 10543 (1995) (noting that potentially 
harmful hazardous waste facilities often attract local opposition, so builders of 
such facilities prefer to locate them in communities that are politically weak 
and cataloguing recent state and federal legislation and case law on 
environmental justice issues); Rachel D. Godsil, Remedying Environmental 
Racism, 90 MICH. L. REV. 394, 398 (1991) (explaining that “minority 
communities are target[ed] for hazardous waste facilities and other 
environmental hazards because their residents are poor and politically 
powerless. Waste management firms find it politically expedient to site these 
facilities in minority communities who tend to be vulnerable to offers of 
compensation made in exchange for accepting hazardous environmental 
conditions”); Gregory H. Meyers, Developing a Cohesive Front Against 
Environmental Injustice, 8 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 27, 30 (2000) (quoting 
environmental justice advocate Luke Cole, Staff Attorney at the California 
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reflect a bias for communities with a higher income base. 
III. A BRIEF HISTORY OF COMMUNITY PLANNING IN NEW YORK 
CITY 
In New York City, the City Planning Commission and the 
City Council are responsible for deciding rezoning requests.21 
Elected officials appoint the Commissioners.22 Community 
Boards can make recommendations to the City Planning 
Commission, but otherwise have no real authority when it comes 
to planning decisions.23 Indeed, the Commission’s processes seem 
designed to discourage public participation—public hearings take 
place at ten o’clock on Wednesday mornings, making the 
hearings inaccessible to those with daytime obligations such as 
work or family, and calendar notices and subscriptions are 
available at a large fee.24 
In 1963, at the beginning of a long trend toward decentralized 
planning, the City Council established Community Boards as 
advisory bodies.25 Borough Presidents appoint their Community 
                                                          
Rural Legal Assistance Foundation, that “poor people are . . . more likely 
than others to have multiple exposures to environmental dangers, facing more 
severe hazards on the job, in the home, in the air they breathe, in the water 
they drink, and in the food they eat”). 
21 See NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF CITY PLANNING, 197-A PLAN 
TECHNICAL GUIDE 1 (1997) (discussing the responsibilities and duties of the 
City Planning Commission and City Council). 
22 For a full explanation of the composition and tasks of the Commission, 
see New York City Planning Commission Website, available at 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/home.html (last visited Jan. 6, 2003) 
[hereinafter N.Y.C. Dep’t of City Planning Website]. The Mayor appoints 
seven Commissioners; the five Borough Presidents and the Public Advocate 
each appoint one. Id. 
23 See generally N.Y.C. CHARTER § 2800(d)(1)-(21) (2001) (setting forth 
the duties of community boards as largely advisory and bodies that assist city 
agencies in disseminating information to local residents). 
24 See N.Y.C. Dep’t of City Planning Website, supra note 22. Individuals 
wishing to be placed on the calendar mailing list are advised to send a certified 
check of $100 to the Department of City Planning for a one year subscription. 
Id. 
25 See N.Y.C. CHARTER § 1152(a) (2001) (“This charter shall take effect 
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Board members.26 Community Board membership is on a 
volunteer basis.27 A New York City Charter revision in 1977 
created the Uniform Land Use Review Procedure (“ULURP”).28 
ULURP mandates that Community Boards review and vote on all 
land use applications in their jurisdictions.29 The creation of 
Community Boards and ULURP signified the growing interest in 
bringing citizen involvement to planning decisions. Although 
ULURP introduced the possibility of Community Board 
sponsored plans under Section 197-a, it did not clarify the details 
of any such plans.30 
                                                          
on the first day of January, nineteen hundred sixty-three.”). See also Thomas 
Angotti, New York City’s “197-a” Community Planning Experience: Power to 
the People or Less Work for Planners?, Pratt Institute Center for Community 
and Environmental Development, available at 
www.picced.org/advocacy/197a. htm (Oct. 19, 1995) (“Community Planning 
Boards were established as advisory bodies in 1963.”). Agnotti’s report on 
New York City community planning experience was presented to the 37th 
annual Conference of the Association of Collegiate Schools of Planning, 
October 19-21, 1995 in Detroit. Id. Agnotti’s research was conducted in 
conjunction with individuals receiving grants from the Municipal Arts Society 
of New York City. Id. 
26 See N.Y.C. CHARTER § 2800(a) (2001) (“For each community district 
created pursuant to chapter sixty-nine there shall be a community board which 
shall consist of (1) not more than fifty persons appointed by the borough 
president for staggered terms of two years”); see also The Municipal Art 
Society of New York, The State of 197-a Planning in New York City 3 (1998) 
[hereinafter MAS, STATE OF 197-A PLANNING]. 
27 See N.Y.C. CHARTER § 2800(c) (2001). (“Members of community 
boards shall serve as such without compensation but shall be reimbursed for 
actual and necessary out-of-pocket expenses in connection with attendance at 
regularly scheduled meetings of the community board.”). 
28 See generally N.Y.C. CHARTER § 197-c (2001). The New York City 
Charter created the Uniform Land Use Review Procedure in 1977, 
establishing community boards as advisory bodies in zoning and land use 
areas. Id. 
29 See N.Y.C. CHARTER § 197-c(c) (2001) (“The department of city 
planning shall be responsible for certifying that applications pursuant to 
subdivision (a) of this section are complete and ready to proceed through the 
uniform land use review procedure provided for in this section.”) 
30 See N.Y.C. CHARTER § 197-c(h) (2002) (“Not later than sixty days 
after expiration of time allowed for the filing of a recommendation or waiver 
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Demands from communities for greater control over land use 
decisions led to a revision of the Charter in 1989. These revisions 
encouraged community planning and active participation by the 
community in rezoning requests, and strengthened Section 197-a 
by providing a process by which communities could sponsor their 
own land use plans.31 The revised Section 197-a offered hope for 
community-sponsored plans by clarifying the steps to put together 
such a plan:32 
Plans for the development, growth, and improvement of 
the city and of its boroughs and community districts may 
be proposed by (1) the mayor, (2) the city planning 
commission, (3) the department of city planning, (4) a 
borough president, (5) a borough board with respect to 
land located within its borough, or (6) a community board 
with respect to land located within its community 
district.33 
The revised Section 197-a took an important step towards 
facilitating meaningful public participation by making planning 
                                                          
with the city planning commission by a borough president, the commission 
shall approve, approve with modifications, or disapprove the application”). 
The ULURP mandates, generally, that Community Boards review all land use 
applications, and allows for a Community Board to sponsor its own land use 
application. Id. 
31 See generally N.Y.C. CHARTER § 197-a(a) (2001). See also Agnotti, 
supra note 25 (“Indeed, the establishment of community boards and a process 
for community planning are responses to decades of intense community 
opposition to official plans, many of which were stopped cold by 
neighborhood protests.”). 
32 See N.Y.C. CHARTER § 197-a(a) (2001). The guidelines provide that 
[a] community board, borough board or borough president that 
proposes any such plan shall submit the plan together with a written 
recommendation to the city planning commission for determinations 
pursuant to subdivision b of this section. Any such submission may be 
made by a community board, borough board or borough president 
only after the board or borough president proposing such a plan has 
held a public hearing on the plan. 
Id. See also N.Y.C. CHARTER § 197-a(c) (2001) (setting forth the documents 
required to accompany any such plans). 
33 N.Y.C. CHARTER § 197-a(a) (2001). 
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available to communities through their Community Boards and 
Borough Presidents.34 It also removed the burden of 
environmental reviews from the Community Boards and gave this 
responsibility to the Department of City Planning.35 
Section 197-a mandated, however, that the City Planning 
Commission set its own standards for reviewing community 
proposals.36 The Commission proceeded to weaken the potential 
impact of the amendments by officially interpreting community 
plans as nonbinding policy guides.37 Now, the finished plans 
merely impose a requirement that future land use decisions be 
reviewed against them.38 The community bears the onerous 
burden of scrutinizing the Commission and exposing action that 
does not conform to the goals of the plan.39 Although the 
Commission encourages monitoring, this arguably creates an 
adversarial, defensive climate that may create conflict between 
communities and the agency.40 
These rules have not been subjected to legal or judicial 
scrutiny, though they would likely be deemed reasonable given 
                                                          
34 See Agnotti, supra note 25. Agnotti notes that, “prior to 1990, there 
was no explicit authorization in the City Charter for Community Boards to 
propose their own plans.” Id. 
35 Id. (“After the Charter revision, the Department of City Planning took 
responsibility for the environmental review of community plans.”). This was 
significant because environmental review is both costly and highly technical, 
two factors that previously foreclosed involvement at the community level. Id. 
36 See N.Y.C. CHARTER § 197-a(b) (2001). The amendments require that 
“[t]he city planning commission shall adopt rules establishing minimum 
standards for the form and content of the plans.” Id. 
37 See 62 R.C.N.Y. § 6-01(b) (2001). The official interpretation states 
that “[a]n adopted plan shall serve as a policy to guide subsequent actions by 
city agencies. . . [t]he existence of an adopted 197-a plan shall not preclude 
the sponsor or any other city agency from developing other plans or taking 
actions not contemplated by the 197-a plan.” Id. 
38 Id. 
39 See generally MAS, STATE OF 197-A PLANNING, supra note 26, at 14. 
Currently, the City Charter has no provision setting forth internal review or 
monitoring methods. Id. 
40 See Spyke, supra note 3, at 274 (noting that “[i]mplementing 
regulations may generate conflicts from the outset by providing only scant 
provisions cast in adversarial terms”). 
WIDMANDMACRO1-20.DOC 4/1/03  2:56 PM 
148 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
that many community proposals lack necessary technical 
specificity and detail.41 The provisions, however, create a 
disincentive for communities to initiate the planning process and 
invest resources in a plan that ultimately has no authority.42 
Moreover, 197-a plans have not proved entirely successful even 
as policy guides due to the lack of technical assistance, scarce 
financial resources and informational obstacles, resulting in plans 
that are piecemeal.43 These problems are exacerbated in low-
income or politically marginalized neighborhoods, and may 
render the 197-a process inaccessible to some communities.44 
Another oft-scrutinized section of the 1989 amendments states 
that the Department of City Planning will “[p]rovide community 
boards with such staff assistance and other professional and 
technical assistance as may be necessary to permit such boards to 
perform their planning duties and responsibilities under this 
                                                          
41 See Angotti, supra note 25 (recognizing that, ultimately, many plans 
have these limitations whether or not they are formally stated because there is 
never guaranteed implementation of a plan). 
42 See id. Angotti notes that, “some communities were quick to recognize 
the limitations of the 197-a process and chose not to invest their energy and 
resources.” Id. He further asks, “[w]hy should a community board spend at 
least two years to develop a plan, and another two years to get it approved, to 
end up with a document that may not have much legal effect on future land 
use?” See also Spyke, supra note 3, at 274. Spyke notes that, even when 
participation does take place, “[w]hoever is likely to participate is likely to 
experience a drain in terms of time and personal cost. Not only does it take 
time to become comfortable with the technical nature of many issues, but 
personal costs tend to come up-front and results can be a long time coming.” 
Id. 
43 Id.; see also MAS, STATE OF 197-A PLANNING, supra note 26, at 8-10 
(noting that plans received by the City Planning Commission are not always 
properly formatted or complete in substance). 
44 This aspect of the Commission’s interpretation unnecessarily aggravates 
the problems of economic disparity and public action inherent in public 
participation programs. See, e.g., Spyke, supra note 3, at 274 (noting that 
“[w]hen participation does take place, studies have shown that participants 
tend to be from upper socioeconomic classes, leading to common charges of 
elitism”). See also infra Part V (discussing the demographic differences 
between Vinegar Hill and Greenpoint and the impact of those differences on 
the success of each community’s proposed plan). 
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chapter.”45 In fact, such assistance is rarely given.46 Only a few 
planners who work with communities are on staff at the 
Department of City Planning, and they focus primarily on 
reviewing the plans rather than assisting with development.47 Nor 
does the City provide consistent training programs for 
Community Board members who want to take on difficult or 
technical planning tasks.48 Scarcity of technical assistance hinders 
low-income communities more than higher-income, because a 
higher-income community may have more access to professional 
planners and developers.49 As the following narratives highlight, 
                                                          
45 N.Y.C. CHARTER § 191(5) (2001); see also MAS, STATE OF 197-A 
PLANNING, supra note 26, at 10 (reiterating this element of the City Charter). 
46 Angotti, supra note 25. Angotti notes that “[i]f resources were 
available to community boards, perhaps more would consider the potential 
benefits of planning. The City Planning Department is the most likely agency 
to provide resources, and has provided very few.” Id. Further, he notes that 
staffing in borough offices has been “progressively cut since 1990.” Id. One 
commentator has noted that failure to provide assistance may also be a product 
of a “philosophical objection to loss of control, something that is inherent in 
public participation programs.” Spyke, supra note 3, at 274. 
 As recently as 2001, Community Board 1 continued to ask the city to 
allocate funds to develop 197-a plans and “urge the City to implement the 
Charter mandate of providing additional funding for each Community Board to 
have a planner on staff.” See DEPARTMENT OF CITY PLANNING, CITY OF NEW 
YORK, COMMUNITY DISTRICT NEEDS 22 (2001) [hereinafter COMMUNITY 
DISTRICT NEEDS]. 
47 Angotti, supra note 25 (noting that the Department has one planner 
city-wide to work part-time in reviewing and processing of 197-a plans and 
planners in Borough offices generally function as reviewers, not advocates). 
48 Id. (noting that “[t]he City does not provide any consistent training in 
planning for community board staff or members”); see also Clarice E. 
Gaylord & Geraldine W. Twitty, Protecting Endangered Communities, 21 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 771, 782 (1994) (noting that responsibility to help 
residents take an active role in planning “also rests in the hands of state and 
local city planners, zoning officials, housing experts, and environmental 
officers who must provide more responsible protection for all communities”). 
49 Angotti, supra note 25 (noting that higher-income communities can 
draw on local professionals to volunteer their time). Additionally, 
communities with little access or appeal to public interest groups are likely to 
suffer inordinately from this scarcity of resources. See Spyke, supra note 3, at 
275 (examining the role of public interest groups in public participation 
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the city may be inclined to provide assistance to certain 
communities, while ignoring others.50 The City Planning 
Commission’s discretion in deciding which communities receive 
assistance strips the 197-a process of any real chance to 
encourage meaningful dialogue between the city and 
communities, especially if that discretion is abused. 
The 197-a planning process suffers from an overall lack of 
emphasis on inclusive public participation. Of the pages of rules 
promulgated by the Commission, only a single sentence is 
devoted to public participation, requiring that “[p]lans shall be 
accompanied by documentation of the public participation in their 
formulation and preparation, such as workshops, hearings, or 
technical advisory committees.”51 This suggests merely that 
hearings or forums be held, but does not require inclusiveness. 
The rules do not mandate, for instance, that all members of the 
community are informed of the public forum or that all languages 
spoken in the community are employed at the meetings or in the 
announcements.52 
IV. TWO CASE STUDIES 
The following case studies provide chronological narratives 
of two communities’ efforts to formulate and present workable 
zoning plans.53 The case study method has obvious shortcomings: 
                                                          
programs). 
50 See infra Part IV (illustrating that Vinegar Hill received more support 
from the city in its planning process than Greenpoint and arguing that this was 
due to the relative, differing appeal of the communities). 
51 62 R.C.N.Y. § 6-04(a)(7) (2002). 
52 The case studies examined in this article demonstrate the importance of 
meaningful public participation requirements that evince consensus building 
and inclusion to insure a democratic land use decision-making scheme and 
highlight that language barriers and dissemination of planning information can 
impact community efforts. See infra Parts IV.A-B (discussing population 
diversity). 
53 The narratives set forth are based on planning documents, records from 
community meetings, area demographics, city decision-making standards, 
neighborhood histories, newspaper accounts of neighborhood transformations, 
and numerous interviews conducted by the author and other investigators with 
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it is by definition narrow in focus and largely anecdotal.54 
Additionally, these are only two of the sixteen 197-a plans in 
various stages of planning in New York City since the Charter 
amendment.55 Thus, these narratives do not purport to reflect the 
general outcome of 197-a plans. They do, however, point out 
weaknesses in the current 197-a process and the public 
participation mechanisms currently in place. If nothing else, these 
narratives illustrate that the current process has failed to live up 
to its goal of encouraging and fostering community-sponsored 
planning. 
A. Vinegar Hill, Brooklyn 
The community of Vinegar Hill is a relatively small 
neighborhood and part of Brooklyn’s Community Board 2.56 The 
                                                          
community activists, city employees, planners and residents. The narratives 
are not exhaustive, but attempt to re-create the sequence of events from each 
community’s initial decision to actively plan neighborhood development to the 
official land use decisions that resulted from the community’s involvement. 
54 See generally Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Case Studies in Legal Ethics: 
Telling Stories in School: Using Case Studies and Stories to Teach Legal 
Ethics, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 787 (2000) (discussing the benefits of the use of 
the case study to enhance the examination of ethical and moral issues in the 
practice of law). Professor Menkel-Meadow describes the tension that exists 
between stories and rules, narratives and principles. Id. She questions, for 
example, the purpose of rules and principles if they can always be argued 
against in a particular instance. Id. at 794. She also acknowledges that the case 
study method raises the problem of choice of story and voice. Id. See also 
Kathryn Hendley, Economic, Legal and Political Dilemmas of Privatization in 
Russia: The Spillover Effects of Privatization on Russian Legal Culture, 5 
TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 39, 51 (1995) (acknowledging that the 
case study approach yields limited data from which it is problematic to draw 
any general conclusions). 
55 MAS, STATE OF 197-A PLANNING, supra note 26, at 24; see also NYC 
Dep’t of City Planning Website, supra note 22 (listing seven 197-a plans that 
have been adopted as of October 18, 2002: Bronx Community District 3, 
Chelsea, Red Hook, Stuyvesant Cove, Comprehensive Manhattan Waterfront, 
Greenpoint, and Williamsburg). 
56 See NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF CITY PLANNING, VINEGAR HILL 
ZONING STUDY 2 (May 1996) [hereinafter NYC ZONING STUDY, VINEGAR 
HILL]. The Department of City Planning undertook and completed a zoning 
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area is just east of the Manhattan Bridge, and bordered by Bridge 
Street on the south, Plymouth Street on the west, the Brooklyn 
Navy Yard on the north and York Street on the east.57 Although 
close in proximity to downtown Manhattan and downtown 
Brooklyn, it is not well serviced by public transportation.58 The 
history of the neighborhood is a familiar one along Brooklyn’s 
waterfront—the neighborhood was predominantly an enclave for 
Irish workers in the 1800s, resulting in residential wood-frame 
houses and some brownstones lining the cobblestone streets next 
to light industrial warehouses along the East River.59 The general 
                                                          
study of Vinegar Hill in 1996 to determine if it was appropriate to rezone 
areas within the neighborhood to a residential district with commercial 
overlays, in order to complement efforts of the Landmarks Preservation 
Commission. Id. at 1. The Department articulated that Vinegar Hill spans 
fifteen acres, or eight city blocks. Id. at 2. Community Board 2 is an area that 
contains many neighborhoods, including the Downtown Brooklyn Business 
District, Atlantic Center and six Historic Landmark Districts such as Brooklyn 
Heights, Boerum Hill and Fort Greene. See COMMUNITY DISTRICT NEEDS, 
supra note 46, at 47. 
57 See NYC ZONING STUDY, VINEGAR HILL, supra note 56, at 1. 
58 See id. at 4 (noting that “mass transit access to the area is very limited. 
There is only one subway and three bus lines which directly serve the study 
area.”). 
59 Id. at 2; see also MARCIA REISS, FULTON FERRY LANDING, DUMBO, 
VINEGAR HILL NEIGHBORHOOD HISTORY GUIDE (2001). Vinegar Hill’s origins 
date back to the early 1800s. By naming the neighborhood after Vinegar Hill 
in Ireland, the site of the 1798 Irish Rebellion against the British, the 
developer hoped to attract the large number of Irish immigrants flowing into 
the country. For an enlightening description of Vinegar Hill’s history, see 
New York Street Scenes, at http://www.forgotten-
ny.com/STREET%20SCENES/Vinegar%20 Hill%20Page/vinegar.html (last 
visited Jan. 1, 2003); see also Names of New York, Vinegar Hill, at 
http://www.newsday. com/features/custom/names/ny-namesofny-
vinegarhill,0,1560754.htmlstory (last visited Nov. 11, 2002). In the twentieth 
century, the neighborhood enjoyed residual revenue from the nearby Naval 
yard. Id. But when the Navy decommissioned the yard in 1966, the 
neighborhood declined into poverty. Id. Today Vinegar Hill occupies only a 
small strip of land consisting of mainly nineteenth century row houses, located 
next to the DUMBO district of Brooklyn. Id. However, the neighborhood is 
thought to be on the rise again, as the area is now considered an enclave for 
artists. Id. A recent census shows that currently over 4,000 people live in the 
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decline of waterfront industry after World War II led to 
abandonment of the area, as was occurring in other waterfront 
sections of Brooklyn.60 In the early 1970s, a burgeoning artists’ 
movement set up residential and working studios in the vacant 
industrial lofts and refurbished the nineteenth century row 
houses.61 This resulted in a small, politically active group of 
inhabitants.62 In 1998, the population of Vinegar Hill was 
estimated at around 225 residents.63 The neighborhood has 12 
businesses employing over 650 people.64 Real estate 
advertisements in a recent New York Times listed two-bedroom 
cooperative apartments in the area as selling for over $1 
                                                          
Vinegar Hill area. See Enclave Links Its Political Fate to Its Rich History, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2002, at B1; see also Real Estate Scene Vinegar Hill 
Aging Well, Downtown’s a Tiny Outpost of the Past, DAILY NEWS, Aug. 17, 
2000, at 14. 
60 See NYC ZONING STUDY, VINEGAR HILL, supra note 56, at 2 
(discussing the Navy’s abandonment of the Brooklyn waterfront as leading to 
“the gradual deterioration of the surrounding area”). 
61 See Mary Miuccio, Vinegar Hill is Like a Small Town in New England, 
Its Residents Say, BROOKLYN PAPER, Oct. 3-15, 1979, at 12. Writing in 1979, 
Miuccio noted “approximately eight years ago, some artsy, speculative and 
gutsy people moved into [Vinegar Hill] and started purchasing abandoned 
buildings and warehouses.” Id. 
62 See id. (noting that “besides investing manual labor and money, the 
new immigrants to the area joined with the few remaining original neighbors 
to fight industrial legal battle”); see also Peter Haley, They Put the Vinegar 
Back in the Hill, and Fought City Hall, PHOENIX, Nov. 30, 1978, at 11. Haley 
commented, “through the combined efforts of newcomers and longtime 
residents, this urban village of industrial lofts and three- and four-story brick 
buildings is making a comeback.” Id. He also noted that “[a]rtists seeking low 
rents and space turned out to be the secret weapon” in Vinegar Hill’s struggle, 
and his interviews with local residents “related how residents banded together” 
to protect local homeowners. Id. at 13 
63 See Amy Waldman, The 2nd Battle of Vinegar Hill, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
1, 1998 at CY8. “Vinegar Hill is roughly nine square blocks, with perhaps 
225 residents and about 19 commercial or manufacturing buildings, a well as a 
sprinkling of mom-and-pop stores.” Id. 
64 Jonathan Bowles, Zones of Contention, CITY LIMITS, Nov. 2000, at 21. 
Bowles noted that, at most recent count, “there were about 52 homes and 12 
businesses employing roughly 650 people in this tiny neighborhood.” Id. at 
24. 
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million.65 
The 2000 demographics for the surrounding areas of 
Community Board 2 revealed a primarily black and white 
nonhispanic total population of 98,620.66 Approximately 7,692 
residents are not citizens.67 Seventy-four percent of the occupied 
housing units are rentals.68 Less than a quarter of the total 
Community Board speaks a language other than English at home, 
and fewer reported that they do not speak English “very well.”69 
A small percentage of the population is assisted by government 
income support.70 Community Board 2 also includes some of 
Brooklyn’s most affluent communities, and the median household 
income is $44,180,71 compared to a city-wide median of 
$39,293.72 
Prior to 1998, Vinegar Hill was zoned primarily for industrial 
use with residential buildings existing as nonconforming uses.73 
                                                          
65 Real Estate Classifieds, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2002. 
66 The black population is estimated at 40.5%, with white nonhispanic 
residents averaging 34.4%. See NYC Department of City Planning, 
Community District Profile, Brooklyn Community District 2 Website, 
available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/lucds/bk2lu.html (last visited 
Dec.31, 2002). 
67 See New York City Department of City Planning, Socioeconomic 
Profiles 1980/1990 Census, Population and Housing 132-37 (Mar. 1993). 
[hereinafter NYC PROFILE, COMM. BD. 2]. Statistics were not available for 
2000 as of the date of publication. 
68 Id. at 131. 
69 A reported 23% speak a language other than English at home and 9.4% 
of the Community Board population reported that they do no speak English 
“very well.” Id. at 126. 
70 17.4% reported receiving government income support. Id. 
71 See HOUSEHOLD INCOME IN 1999 NEW YORK CITY COMMUNITY 
DISTRICTS, TABLE SF3 INC P-301 (2000), available at http://www.nyc.gov/ 
html/dcp/pdf/census/sf3incp301.pdf (last visited Jan. 6, 2003). 
72 Id. 
73 See NEW YORK CITY PLANNING COMMISSION, Calendar no. 14, 
C980067 ZMK at 1 (Jan. 21, 1998) [hereinafter “CITY PLANNING 
COMMISSION FINAL REPORT”]. On January 21, 1998, the Department of City 
Planning issued a final report on the application for an amendment of the 
zoning map and regulations of Vinegar Hill as filed by the Department on July 
31, 1997. Id. See also Bowles, supra note 64, at 24 (noting that “[r]esidents 
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Two blocks were zoned for heavy manufacturing, M3-1, which 
allows for heavy industrial uses, more objectionable hazards and 
lower performance standards.74 The remainder of the 
neighborhood was zoned for light manufacturing, M1-2, which 
allows for a wide range of manufacturing but with higher 
performance standards.75 In addition to the nonconforming row 
houses,76 other zoning discrepancies exist, due largely to 
conversions of warehouses into live-work loft space.77 
This pattern persists in many areas along urban waterfronts, 
where zoning regulations are remnants of the era of industry on 
the rivers.78 Loft conversions are representative of today’s urban 
                                                          
and manufacturers managed to coexist for decades; while the area was long 
zoned M-3, clusters of 19th century rowhouses were allowed to stand amid the 
industry as a ‘nonconforming use.’”). 
74 See generally CITY PLANNING COMMISSION FINAL REPORT, supra note 
73, at 1. New York City is divided into three basic zoning district: residential 
(R), commercial (C), and manufacturing (M). The three basic categories are 
further subdivided by the intensity of use, whether for retail or manufacturing 
categories, parking, building bulk or residential density. Manufacturing uses 
and certain intense commercial uses are subject to performance standards that 
limit noise, air pollution and other nuisance-creating activity. These zoning 
controls provide minimum acceptable standards and are designed to provide 
building occupants and the general public with light, air and ventilation and a 
safer, more livable environment. For a full description of zoning regulations 
and standards in New York City, see NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF CITY 
PLANNING, NEW YORK CITY ZONING, available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/ 
dcp/html/zone/ zonetext.html (Sept. 25, 2002) (setting forth the Web version 
of the Zoning Resolution of the City of New York including all text 
amendments approved by the City Council). 
75 See id. This zoning classification is often a buffer between residential 
and heavier manufacturing zones. Id. 
76 NYC ZONING STUDY, VINEGAR HILL, supra note 56, at 2-3. 
77 Id. at 3 (“The predominant landuse in the area is industrial with a 
scattering of residential uses. However, over the years there have been 
residential conversions in the loft buildings.”). See also Haley, supra note 62, 
at 13 (pointing out that “[a]rtists seeking low rents and space turned out to be 
the secret weapon in the struggle for real estate” in Vinegar Hill). 
78 See, e.g., Lisa Haarlander, Lofty Living: Eight Buildings in Downtown 
Area Being Converted Into New Apartments, BUFF. NEWS, Apr. 15, 2002, at 
C1 (noting the rise in the trend and frequency in conversion of industrial and 
warehouse space into residential lofts in urban areas); Benjamin Forgey, 
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society, where commercial shipping is more road-based and 
industrial installations along urban waterfronts are no longer 
necessary for industrial shipping.79 This is not to suggest that the 
manufacturing zones are obsolete; they do, and must continue to, 
house small manufacturers and essential noxious operations, but 
the importance of waterfront access is lessened. Vinegar Hill is 
also home to a waste treatment equipment storage facility, Con 
Edison property and various distribution and small manufacturing 
centers.80 
Discussion of changes in the area began appearing in the 
media in the late 1970s; one commentator characterized it as a 
neighborhood comeback generated by “the combined efforts of 
newcomers and longtime residents.”81 To orchestrate the 
comeback, area residents lobbied then City Councilman Abe 
Gerges and State Assemblyman Harvey Strelzin to include 
Vinegar Hill in Mayor Koch’s list of areas marked for low-
interest federal renovation loans.82 This allowed many residents 
to buy and repair row houses in the area and establish a 
residential core.83 
Vinegar Hill residents faded from activism until the mid-
1990s, when a waste treatment company bought the property of a 
                                                          
Uncovering the Waterfront, WASH. POST, Jan. 15, 1994, at G01 (commenting 
on the rise in conversion of Naval and industrial installations and stating that 
“[t]he urban waterfront is being transformed worldwide—and, in large part, 
for the better”); Robert Marchant, Housing Planned in Former Electric Plant: 
Developer Plans Waterfront Apartments in Vacant Structure, J. NEWS, Mar. 
25, 2002, at B (noting urban trends towards “converting [ ] old industrial 
infrastructure on the waterfront to new uses—such as a new park, and a 
library and apartments converted from [ ] old factor[ies]”). 
79 See generally supra note 78 (noting the rise in conversion of urban 
waterfront industrial fixtures into new uses). 
80 NYC ZONING STUDY, VINEGAR HILL, supra note 56, at 2-3. 
81 Haley, supra note 62, at 13. 
82 Id. at 1-3 (noting that lobbying efforts convinced the mayor’s office to 
grant renovation loans to Vinegar Hill). 
83 See generally id. at 1. Haley commented that the “most obvious sign of 
comeback has been Mayor Ed Koch’s announcement that Vinegar Hill will be 
among 22 neighborhoods in the city designated for a new federal housing loan 
program aimed at small homeowners.” Id. 
WIDMANDMACRO1-20.DOC 4/1/03  2:56 PM 
 COMMUNITY PLANNING 157 
135-year-old neighborhood church and demolished it to use the 
space for equipment storage.84 Though the church was defunct, 
the action generated neighborhood uproar that encouraged 
Community Board 2 to establish a special task force to explore 
possible 197-a plans for the area.85 The neighborhood began a 
197-a planning process in 1995.86 Although the 197-a plan was 
never completed, the area won landmark status in 1997, when the 
Landmarks Preservation Commission (“LPC”) proposed historic 
designation for the area’s row houses.87 The Department of City 
Planning undertook a zoning study of the area “to determine if it 
is appropriate to rezone areas within Vinegar Hill to a residential 
district with commercial overlays, in order to compliment the 
efforts of the LPC.”88 This study was similar to a 197-a plan, but 
was sponsored by the Department of City Planning itself, rather 
than a community board. After formally studying the land use of 
the area at the residents’ request, the City Planning Commission 
proposed rezoning the area to residential.89 According to media 
                                                          
84 Waldman, supra note 63, at CY8 (noting that the demolition generated 
public outcry and local rallying towards rezoning efforts); see also Merle 
English, A Sweet Little Place Called Home; Vinegar Hill Is Little Known But 
Well Loved By Residents, NEWSDAY, Sept. 20, 1992, at 2 (noting that 
“Vinegar Hill came into the limelight recently when residents expressed 
concern that St. Anne’s, a 132-year-old Catholic Church and the borough’s 
oldest parish, was to be demolished to make way, some had heard, for a 
garbage transfer plant”). 
85 See Dennis Holt, Vinegar Hill and DUMBO are Subjects of CB2 Task 
Force, PHOENIX, Jan. 29, 1996. According to Holt, there was “no dispute as 
to why the study [was] under way,” and his articulation of the Task Force’s 
purpose statement reveals that razing of “historic buildings and streets” along 
with the desire to revise “outmoded zoning” for increased residential space 
prompted the organized effort. Id. 
86 See MAS, STATE OF 197-A PLANNING, supra note 26, at 24. 
87 See Bowles, supra note 64, at 23-24 (noting that city council members 
sought and achieved landmark status for Vinegar Hill architecture and that 
these efforts played a role in gaining official neighborhood recognition by the 
city); see also CITY PLANNING COMMISSION FINAL REPORT, supra note 73, at 
2. 
88 NYC ZONING STUDY, VINEGAR HILL, supra note 56, at 1. 
89 See generally CITY PLANNING COMMISSION FINAL REPORT, supra note 
73, for a full review of the rezoning proposals adopted by the City Planning 
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reports, the City Planning Commission’s proposal was intended 
to block the possibility of subsequent sitings of waste treatment 
stations in the area, a major concern of the residents.90 
Public debates and hearings on the rezoning included vocal 
groups representing various viewpoints.91 Area businesses 
vigorously opposed the rezoning proposal because they feared 
forcible relocation, loss of the right to expand and limitations on 
the resale value of their property.92 The rezoning was also 
controversial because of perceived ties to a separate plan to 
                                                          
Commission. 
90 Philip Lentz, Vinegar Hill Zoning Plan Puts Businesses in a Pickle, 
CRAIN’S N.Y. BUS., Dec. 15, 1997, at 16 (noting that “City Planning 
Commissioner Joseph Rose says the administration was motivated by the 
concern over greater transfer station activity in the neighborhood.”); see also 
Waldman, supra note 63, at CY8 (stating that “city officials said the rezoning 
was motivated in large part by the fear that Tocci Brothers would start treating 
waste on the lot, across the street from a row of historic houses.”). 
91 See, e.g., Bill Farrell, Vinegar Hill Eyes Future Decisions on Zoning, 
N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Nov. 24, 1997. Farrell notes that “[b]uilders, residents 
and city planners all with separate visions [were] joining the debate about the 
area’s future.” Id. He quotes and articulates the varying concerns of each 
constituency, noting, ultimately, that “two proposed zoning changes being 
debated would spur dramatic changes, if approved, along a stretch of Brooklyn 
waterfront.” Id. 
92 See Lentz, supra note 90 (noting fears of existing businesses that 
“rezoning would make it harder for them to obtain financing and grow, which 
could eventually force them to move.”); Bowles, supra note 64, at 24. 
According to Bowles, local manufacturers were “backed into a corner” by the 
rezoning and would “need special permits to expand.” Id. He cites comments 
by several industrial leaders as fearing growth limitations due to the rezoning, 
despite the fact that the businesses were “grandfathered in under the old 
zoning.” Id. 
 Such disputes between residents and businesses are common around plans 
that rezone from manufacturing to residential. See, e.g., Daniel Lee, Bi-Mart 
Project Faces New Challenges, COLUMBIAN, May 2, 2000 at b1 (noting that 
the building project “has followed a long road filled with council debate and 
challenges by rivals”); Martha Ezzard, Woman’s Touch Could be Just Right to 
Handle Growth, ATL. JOURNAL AND CONST., Dec. 13, 1998 at 1C (stating 
that plans envisioning mixed use zoning are being abused by developers who 
take advantage of mixed use zoning by developing the commercial and not the 
residential areas). 
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develop the waterfront area, thus worrying some newer residents 
that excessive revitalization would drive them out.93 Dissension 
came to a head at the Community Board meeting on October 8, 
1997.94 The meeting ended without a vote.95 At a November 20, 
1997 public hearing, held by then-Brooklyn Borough President 
Howard Golden, eighteen speakers testified in opposition to the 
proposed zoning amendment, twenty-four speakers testified in 
favor, and the Chairperson of Community Board 2 took no 
position.96 The City Planning Commission’s account of the final 
public hearing on December 3, 1997 reveals that the residents’ 
position was somewhat better represented, but a substantial 
amount of opposition from community businesses remained.97 
The Commission adopted the rezoning on January 21, 1998.98 
The Commission’s report summed up the residents’ concerns 
such as “the need to preserve the fragile but historic housing 
stock of Vinegar Hill, the friction between heavy truck traffic, 
related industrial uses, and the narrow residential-scale streets 
and street furniture, as well as the threat of expansion of waste 
transfer industry.”99 The report described the opposition’s 
concern that rezoning would have “a detrimental effect on the 
jobs in the area, and create hardships for the businesses that 
might want to expand or sell their property to other businesses in 
                                                          
93 See generally Lentz, supra note 90 (noting the varying, ultimately 
irreconcilable, visions and hopes of Vinegar Hill entrepreneurs and residents). 
94 See Dennis Holt, Board 2 Unable to Resolve Condo Vinegar Hill Issues 
at Meeting, PHOENIX, Oct. 10, 1997 (noting the “futility and confusion” that 
haunted past meetings was present at the “stormy” October 8th meeting 
discussing the two controversial zoning issues). 
95 Id. The board could not conduct any business at the meeting because it 
lacked a quorum. Id. 
96 See CITY PLANNING COMMISSION FINAL REPORT, supra note 73, at 7-
9. 
97 See id. at 8-9. Specifically, speakers in favor included 14 residents of 
Vinegar Hill and the surrounding area, an owner of a business in the rezoning 
area, a representative of the Historic Council, and state senate and assembly 
members representatives. Id. There were 10 speakers in opposition. Id. 
98 See id. at 13. 
99 Id. at 8-9. 
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the future.”100 The Commission’s report stressed the historic 
designation of the area, claiming that the zoning amendments 
“would bring existing nonconforming residences into 
conformance; allow for the development of vacant property in 
keeping with the existing bulk and character of the area; and 
reinforce the historic character of predominantly residential 
buildings.”101 The final rezoning reflected some consideration of 
the businesses’ concerns as well, reducing the area to be down-
zoned from light manufacturing to residential use.102 This 
reduction allowed four “light industrial/commercial” uses of 
twelve to remain active, including a toy manufacturing and 
import company, a moving company, an equipment storage 
business and a restaurant supply manufacturer.103 The report did 
not explain why these particular revisions were made, other than 
the Commission’s desire to retain “viable manufacturing jobs in 
the City.”104 
The community of Vinegar Hill never submitted a 197-a 
plan.105 The present zoning in Vinegar Hill is a direct result of 
                                                          
100 Id. at 9. 
101 Id. at 10. 
102 CITY PLANNING COMMISSION FINAL REPORT, supra note 73, at 12-13. 
The area was down-zoned from M1-2 to R6A and R6B. Id. Code designations 
are numbered levels within each zoning. Id. These numbers correspond to 
height, space, and other infrastructure-based requirements necessary for the 
zoning code. Id. 
103 Id. at 11. 
104 Id. at 10. 
105 See COMMUNITY DISTRICT NEEDS, supra note 46, at 55. Community 
Board 2 is currently discussing a comprehensive plan for the entire waterfront, 
encompassing the Navy Yard, Empire State Park, Fulton Ferry Landing and 
Piers 1-5. Id. Moreover, there is much talk in the media of developing 
residential cooperative apartments and high-end retail and entertainment 
complexes in the areas immediately adjacent to Vinegar Hill. See Nadine 
Brozan, One a Rental, the Other Condo and Commercial, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
4, 2001 (discussing real estate plans by developer David C. Walentas, who has 
owned large chunks of land in the area and worked to revitalize the 
community); see also Lore Croghan, Real Estate Watch: Secret’s Out About 
Move to Brooklyn, CRAIN’S N.Y. BUSINESS, Jan. 21, 2002, at 1 (identifying 
large industrial and business tenants moving to northern Brooklyn 
neighborhoods). 
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the alliance between residents and politicians, as well as a 
development trend that began in the mid-1990s.106 By 1995, most 
of the area was zoned for residential use, with a light 
manufacturing zone buffer occupying the former heavy 
manufacturing zoning designation.107 There remains a one-block 
commercial overlay.108  
B. Greenpoint, Brooklyn 
Greenpoint is another Brooklyn community with a long 
history of planning activism, albeit with many more hurdles to 
overcome than Vinegar Hill. Set in Community Board 1, 
Greenpoint is bound by the East River on the west, Newton 
Creek on the north, the Brooklyn-Queen’s Expressway on the 
east and southeast, and McCarren Park on the south.109 The area 
is primarily comprised of three enclaves: the Polish community, 
the Latino community and a newer community of young artists 
attracted by low rents.110 Public transportation in and out of 
                                                          
106 See Bowles, supra note 64, at 24 (noting that efforts to protect 
waterfront neighborhoods from industrial development by residential and 
mixed-use rezoning has locked out businesses helpful to the Brooklyn 
economy); see also Penny Lee, East River Information Session, East River 
Project, Van Alen Institute, available at http://www.vanalen.org/forums/er_ 
info.htm (highlighting several projects on the Queens waterfront that 
successfully incorporated both business and community interests). 
107 NEW YORK CITY DEP’T OF CITY PLANNING, ZONING MAP 12c (1995) 
(showing M3-1 zoning replaced by M1-2). 
108 Id. This commercial section is zoned C2-4. Id. 
109 See New York City Department of City Planning Website, Comm. 
Dist. Profile: Brooklyn, available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/ 
lucds/bk1lu. html#data (last visited Nov. 12, 2002). Community Board 1 
consists of Greenpoint and Williamsburg. See GREENPOINT 197-A 
COMMITTEE, GREENPOINT 197-A PLAN 39 (June 1998) [hereinafter PROPOSED 
GREENPOINT 197-A]. 
110 See generally Tom Gilbert, Greetings from Greenpoint, BROOKLYN 
BRIDGE, Sept./Oct. 1999, at 90. Gilbert’s article describes the rich, vibrant 
Polish community of Greenpoint, including many Polish shops and 
restaurants, as well as the “significant” Hispanic community with “just under 
20 percent” of the area’s residents identifying themselves as such in the 1990 
census. Id. at 90-95, 90. According to Gilbert “[n]ew settlers” in Greenpoint 
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Greenpoint is limited to two stops on the “G” train, one farther 
stop on the Manhattan bound “L” train and three bus lines.111 
Greenpoint has a strong infrastructure—many neighborhood 
businesses, a thriving main street and multi-generational 
families.112 Greenpoint has roughly 36,700 residents, and its 
population is predominantly white, nonhispanic.113 Greenpoint’s 
workforce participation makes up a larger percentage of its total 
population than that of Brooklyn or New York City as a whole.114 
It is considered a “working neighborhood,” and local residents 
staff many of Greenpoint’s manufacturing plants, mostly in the 
                                                          
are “often artists” that were outsted from Manhattan by high rents and there is 
a “burgeoning artist community” in the neighborhood. Id. at 96. See also 
PROPOSED GREENPOINT 197-A, supra note 109, at 18 (discussing the change in 
Greenpoint’s ethnic composition due to immigration in the 1990s); 
COMMUNITY DISTRICT NEEDS, supra note 46, at 17 (noting that “Greenpoint 
and Williamsburg contain within them an almost unparalleled variety of 
cultural, religious, racial and ethnic groups, who reside in several distinct 
communities”). 
111 PROPOSED GREENPOINT 197-A, supra note 109, at 58. 
112 See id. at 3. It has been noted that “Greenpoint has many families that 
have lived there for three or more generations. Those families sustain 
Greenpoint’s tradition and folklore.” Id.; See also Gilbert, supra note 110, at 
90 (noting that although Greenpoint has experienced recent variations and 
shifts in demographics, these shifts are “merely variations on economic and 
cultural experiences familiar to both fourth-generation families and 
newcomers”). 
113 See NEW YORK CITY DEP’T OF CITY PLANNING, SOCIOECONOMIC 
PROFILES - 1980 / 1990 CENSUS, POPULATION AND HOUSING 126-31 (Mar. 
1993) [hereinafter NYC PROFILE, COMM. BD. 1]. Greenpoint’s population 
was listed as approximately 73.2% white, nonhispanic in 1990. Id. “Although 
the percentage of Blacks and Asians in Greenpoint rose in the 1980s, their 
share of Greenpoint’s population “remains modest” and the number of Asians 
increased from 2.2% of the population in 1980 to 3.5% in 1990, and the Black 
population doubled its numbers in the same time, though it still remains small 
(only 1.2% and 3.5% of the total population respectively in 1990).” 
PROPOSED GREENPOINT 197-A, supra note 109, at 17. As of the date of 
publication, the 2000 Census reports broken down by neighborhood had not 
been released. 
114 See PROPOSED GREENPOINT 197-A, supra note 109, at 35. 
Greenpoint’s workforce is 65% of its total population, whereas that of 
Brooklyn is 58.9% and New York City as a whole is listed at 61.7%. Id. 
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woodworking and textile industries.115 
According to the 2000 Census, Community Board 1 has a 
total population of 160,338, with a majority white, nonhispanic 
(48%) or Hispanic (37.7%) in origin.116 Of the residents of 
Community Board 1, 17% are not citizens.117 Roughly two-thirds 
speak a language other than English at home, and 38.5% report 
that they do not speak English “very well.”118 The average 
median household income in 2000 was $26,325.119 Roughly one-
third of the population receives government income assistance.120 
A majority of the community’s housing units are rentals.121 
Historically, the zoning designations along Greenpoint’s 
waterfront were similar to Vinegar Hill, with properties along the 
water zoned for industry, and residential properties located just 
inland from the industrial area.122 The entire stretch of 
                                                          
115 Id. The “businesses and jobs” profile of Greenpoint’s proposed 197-a 
plan stated that “among the many small-scale industries, it appears that craft-
related manufacturing, in particular wood-working, thrives in Greenpoint.” Id. 
Additionally, “other industries that currently prosper in Greenpoint include 
furniture manufacturers, lumber wholesalers, precision machinery makers, the 
textile industry, and others. Many of the jobs in these industries are filled by 
Greenpoint residents.” Id. 
116 See N.Y.C. Dep’t of City Planning, Comm. Dist. Profile: Brooklyn 
CD 1: Greenpoint, Williamsburg, available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/ 
html/lucds/bk1lu.html#data (last visited Nov. 12, 2002). 
117 NYC PROFILE, COMM. BD. 1, supra note 113, at 126. 
118 Id. Specifically, 69.7% speak a language other than English in the 
home. Id. 
119 See NYC Dep’t. of City Planning Website, supra note 22. This figure 
is relatively low, compared to the city-wide median household income of 
$39,293. 
120 Id. The percentage of the population receiving government assistance 
was reported as 32.9%. 
121 See NYC PROFILE, COMM. BD. 1, supra note 113, at 131. 
Approximately 86% of the housing units are rentals. 
122 See generally PROPOSED GREENPOINT 197-A, supra note 109, at 20-24 
(reviewing the existing zoning and land use standards in Greenpoint). Such a 
mixed-use plan is typical of old New York, where industry depended on rivers 
for shipping and workers lived near their jobs. Id. Greenpoint’s proposed plan 
specifically points out that “a number of factors have left the waterfront 
underutilized, including the shift away from manufacturing towards a service-
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Greenpoint’s waterways is zoned M3-1 for heavy manufacturing 
with a lighter manufacturing M1-1 buffer zone immediately 
inland.123 There is an R-6 residential zone approximately three 
blocks from all water access.124 As in Vinegar Hill, there are 
nonconforming residential structures in Greenpoint’s 
manufacturing zones.125 Ad hoc zoning decisions and illegal 
conversions have created environmentally unsafe and inefficient 
conditions.126 Many of the heavy manufacturing M-3 zones are 
vacant or illegal residential conversions, while the M1 “buffer” 
zones contain both light manufacturing and residential uses.127 
There are also some pre-existing nonconforming uses of light 
manufacturing in residential zones.128 Compared to the rest of 
New York City neighborhoods, Greenpoint houses an inordinate 
amount of essential, yet locally undesirable, land uses.129 These 
                                                          
based economy, containerization of the shipbuilding industry, and trucking as 
a means of shipping.” Id. at 20. 
123 See id. The buffer zone is occupied by both residential and light 
manufacturing uses. Id. 
124 Id. at 22. (noting that “[a]t the core of the Greenpoint neighborhood 
lies the R-6 medium density residential zone”). 
125 Id. at 20. The proposed plan notes that “an increasing amount of 
conversion from manufacturing to residential has taken place, in particular in 
the loft buildings near the East River.” Id. As noted, this pattern is consistent 
with that in Vinegar Hill and many urban waterfront installations. See supra 
note 78 (reviewing recent trends in development along urban waterfronts). 
126 Id. at 32. According to the proposed plan, “recent conversion—illegal 
and legal—of manufacturing lofts to live and work lofts has increased the level 
of residential non-compliant uses.” Id. Rezoning these areas to mixed-use 
zones “would limit industrial expansion to those business[es] that enter into 
good neighbor agreements and that can demonstrate that they can meet strict 
environmental performance standards” and foster “a healthier and more 
desirable community.” Id. 
127 See PROPOSED GREENPOINT 197-A, supra note 109, at 20. The 
occupied buffer zones are a distinct contrast to the largely vacant parcels of 
land along the East River waterfront and 20 vacant acres of land including 
piers and the Greenpoint Terminal Market site. Id. 
128 Id. at 20. The proposed plan notes that “some light manufacturing still 
occurs in pre-exisiting non-conforming uses within residential zones.” Id. 
129 See generally id. at 26-32. The proposed plan describes and catalogues 
a number of businesses that moved into the spaces abandoned by ship builders 
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include the city’s largest wastewater treatment facility, nine waste 
transfer stations, and numerous petroleum and natural gas storage 
facilities.130 
Greenpoint won some historic designation status in 1982, but 
that designation did not seem to affect the community’s ability to 
rezone.131 At that point, the area was known as 
Greenpoint/Williamsburg.132 Community Board 1 began a 
planning process with local residents and Columbia University’s 
Urban Planning Studio in 1985.133 The results of this process 
were eventually compiled in a “Policy and Resource Handbook” 
which, despite providing residents with a helpful introduction to 
the idea of community planning, rendered no concrete results. 134 
Community involvement in the Greenpoint/Williamsburg plan 
began in earnest in 1989 with open meetings facilitated by 
Community Board 1.135 Community involvement initially 
revolved around environmental issues, and the New York City 
Department of Environmental Protection initiated the 
                                                          
and lumberyards that “once crowded Greenpoint’s shores.” Id. at 26. These 
include, for example, “a growing number of public and private facilities such 
as waste transfer stations, a sewage treatment plant, the former municipal 
incinerator, the marine transfer station, and a range of facilities suspected of 
storing hazardous substances.” Id. 
130 See id. at 28. 
131 See Policy and Resource Handbook for Waterfront Development, 1 
COLUMBIA URBAN PLANNING STUDIO 24 (1987) [hereinafter COLUMBIA 
HANDBOOK] (noting that “[t]he Landmarks Preservation Commission report 
on Greenpoint emphasizes the historical significance of the surviving 19th-
century workers’ housing and original commercial buildings along Franklin 
Street”). 
132 Williamsburg is the neighborhood just south of Greenpoint, also 
bordering the East River. See New York City Department of City Planning, 
Zoning Map 12d, 13b. 
133 See generally COLUMBIA HANDBOOK, supra note 131. The completed 
handbook sets forth the planning goals and visions of Greenpoint’s residents 
and the desire to implement renovation efforts within the neighborhood. Id. 
134 As noted, the handbook was a student project and, as such, had no 
binding authority on city agencies. Id. 
135 See PROPOSED GREENPOINT 197-A, supra note 109, at 8. Five open 
meetings were held, “facilitated by a planning firm hired by the Community 
Board.” Id. 
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Environmental Benefits Program (“EBP”) to assess the 
environmental health of Greenpoint/Williamsburg.136 The EBP 
was funded by a settlement with the Newton Creek Sewage 
Treatment Plant.137 This program was originally touted by all as a 
                                                          
 136 See Nancy E. Anderson, Notes from the Front Line, 21 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 757, 768-69 (1994) (noting that this program was designed to 
address urban environmental issues in a community-based manner); see also 
Hillary Gross et al., Environmental Justice: A Review of State Responses, 8 
HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 41, 62 (2001) (noting that the 
Environmental Benefits Program was a program that operated between 1991 
and 1994, focusing exclusively on the Greenpoint/Williamsburg 
neighborhood). The EBP dealt with environmental justice concerns by 
attempting to engage area residents to help define, develop, and implement 
solutions to their environmental problems and by allowing them to participate 
in the city’s decision-making process. Id.; see also Robert W. Collin & Robin 
Morris Collin, The Role of Communities in Environmental Decisions: 
Communities Speaking for Themselves, 13 ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 37, 79-80 
(1998) (explaining that the EBP operated from the office of a Community 
Watchperson and included resident-based monitoring and research using 
residents to collect information to supplement an epidemiological study of 
pollution, disease, and mortality in the neighborhood); Nancy E. Anderson, 
The Visible Spectrum, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 723, 727-28 (1994) (describing 
that the EBP was undertaken by the New York City Department of 
Environmental Protection in order to address some of the inequities caused by 
local sources of pollution in New York City and that “[t]his program may 
serve as a model for other communities in the effort to address environmental 
inequities”). 
137 See Anderson, supra note 136, at 769; see also In re City of N.Y. 
Dep’t Envtl. Prot., No. R2-3183-90-08, slip. op. at 3. In re City addressed 
overcapacity problems at the STP. Id. The STP’s sewage flow exceeded its 
permitted limit of 310 million gallons per day, and did not perform required 
“secondary” levels of sewage treatment. Id. The Consent Order was designed 
to solve these problems. Id. The North River case involved the problem of 
noxious odors emanating from the plant and the need to control them. Id.; see 
also Samara Swanston, Environmental Social Movements Since Love Canal, 8 
BUFF. ENVTL. L. J. 283, 283-89 (2001). According to Swantson, the 
Watchperson Project was formed as a result of a community initiative to use 
an $850,000 fine imposed by the DEC on the Department of Environmental 
Protection for New York City’s operation of the Newtown Creak Sewage 
Treatment Plant in violation of the Clean Water Act. Id. Ultimately, the DEC 
imposed a fine as a result of communities’ vigorous complaints about the 
odors and other problems at the New York Creek sewage treatment plant. Id. 
The Project also intervened when the Department of Sanitation did not require 
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partnership effort between the city and the community, “the 
environmental version of government by the people and for the 
people.”138 It focused on information gathering and policy 
making, with efforts to document the environmental problems 
and enforce pollution prevention methods.139 Soon, however, 
residents, environmental experts and planning experts criticized 
the EBP as favoring evaluation over remediation.140 The residents 
wrote a letter to the Department of Environmental Protection 
expressing concern that the program was not working as a 
partnership and that community issues were not being 
addressed.141 
While the EBP continued to amass data and develop a 
cumulative risk methodology, residents concerned about 
immediate effects formed coalitions to fight for enforcement and 
remediation.142 Around this time, the Greenpoint/Williamsburg 
                                                          
environmental impact statements and the Department of Environmental 
Conservation did not enforce the stipulation of settlement. Id. 
138 See NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, 
GREENPOINT/WILLIAMSBURG ENVIRONMENTAL BENEFITS PROGRAM, at 2. See 
also Gross et al., supra note 136, at 62 (discussing the EBP’s goal to involve 
residents of the Greenpoint/Williamsburg neighborhood in responding to 
environmental problems); see also Federal Funding Available for 
Environmental Justice Issues in the Bronx, 39 NEW YORK VOICE, 
INC./HARLEM USA 19 (August 16, 1995), available at 1995 WL 1544343 
(describing the environmental benefits program as a “community-led 
initiative” to become involved in environmental issues). 
139 Id. 
140 See, e.g., Manuel Perez-Rivas, Pollution Study is Muddy Issue, N. Y. 
NEWSDAY, Feb. 23, 1992 (discussing criticism of the EBP plan to conduct a 
$850,000 survey to assess the environmental damage instead of working on 
prevention methodology); see also Anderson, supra note 136, at 728, 736 
(discussing the debatable success of the EBP’s community mobilization effort 
and skepticism expressed by residents of the community). 
141 Letter from Steering Committee, to New York City Department of 
Environmental Protection (May 7, 1993) (on file with author). 
142 See PROPOSED GREENPOINT 197-a, supra note 109, at 3. Since the late 
1950s Greenpoint residents have responded to the adverse effects of certain 
public policies by filing petitions, testifying at hearings, and establishing 
working groups and advisory committees. Id. at 3. Their efforts resulted in the 
creation of the Greenpoint Plan, which provides a means for residents and city 
WIDMANDMACRO1-20.DOC 4/1/03  2:56 PM 
168 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
alliance split into two separate groups, precipitated in part by the 
Department of City Planning’s identification of 22 subareas 
within Community District 1 to be studied for possible rezoning 
of manufacturing zones to permit residential development.143 One 
of these subareas was in Williamsburg and became the first area 
studied in detail by the Department of City Planning in 1996.144 
With the help of a professional planner, Williamsburg residents 
created a 197-a plan focusing on the waterfront area.145 This plan, 
and the Department of City Planning’s study, led to the rezoning 
of a subarea in Williamsburg in 1998 from an M3-1 heavy 
manufacturing zone to a C4-3 high commercial area.146 
                                                          
agencies to discuss Greenpoint’s development and revival. See also Elizabeth 
Hays, Power Plant Plan Jeered Greenpoint, Willliamsburg Activists Berate 
Developer, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, June 25, 2001 (providing a contemporaneous 
account of critiques leveled by Brooklyn residents upon development plans to 
place a power plant in Greenpoint/Williamsburg); Elizabeth Hays, Greenpoint 
Backs Burner Board 1 Fights Dismantling of Shutdown Incinerator, N.Y. 
DAILY NEWS, Apr. 4, 2001 (indicating community support for efforts to 
decrease industrial waste in Greenpoint); Elizabeth Hays, Greenpoint Fears 
Power Ploy, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Feb. 28, 2001 (expressing general suspicion 
by residents of political and economic motives of siting decisions). 
143 See N. Y. CITY DEP’T OF CITY PLANNING, WILLIAMSBURG BRIDGE 
AREA ZONING STUDY, Sub-area 12, Phase II Report, May 1996, at 1 
(describing the Department of City Planning’s identification of areas to be 
studied to determine if manufacturing areas should be down-zoned to permit 
residential development). 
144 Id. 
145 See PROPOSED GREENPOINT 197-A, supra note 109, at 14. Specifically, 
“[t]he Williamsburg 197-a Plan focuses on a linear stretch of three 
interconnected neighborhoods along the East River waterfront.” Id. 
146 See NEW YORK CITY DEP’T OF CITY PLANNING, ZONING MAP 12d, 
13b (indicating the zoning classifications for each section of Williamsburg). 
Greenpoint was not addressed in Williamsburg’s 197-a plan. See PROPOSED 
GREENPOINT 197-A, supra note 109, at 14. Community Board One and local 
community groups from Greenpoint and Williamsburg began to create a 197-a 
plan to synthesize views and ideas in response to the pressures of increasing 
demand for housing, decline of heavy manufacturing and increasing rents to 
do illegal conversions to residential lofts. Id. Eventually, however, “[g]iven 
the diversity of interests, issues, and the structural differences between the two 
communities, it was determined that two 197-a Plans covering the two 
geographically distinct areas of Williamsburg and Greenpoint should be 
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At the same time, Greenpoint’s residents were vigorously 
pursuing their own 197-a process with technical assistance and 
resources from the Pratt Institute Center for Community and 
Environmental Development.147 Earlier attempts at community 
planning in Greenpoint were undermined by breakdowns in 
communication between different groups—ethnic divisions 
deepened, homeowners distanced themselves from renters, 
residents quarreled with industry and environmentalists were at 
odds with the labor force.148 As a result, prior proposals lost 
momentum before reaching fruition.149 
Because of the history of dissension among residents, the 
197-a Steering Committee expanded its efforts to include all 
members of the community throughout the 197-a process.150 The 
                                                          
prepared.” Id. 
147 See PROPOSED GREENPOINT 197-A, supra note 109, at 8-13 (discussing 
the planning process undertaken by Greenpoint residents and community 
groups). Greenpoint’s 197-a plan “was refined and completed [ ] with 
technical assistance and resources from the Pratt Institute Center for 
Community and Environmental Development (“PICCED”) and with the 
energy, commitment and sustained participation of members of Greenpoint’s 
197-a Committee.” Id at 8. Both the Pratt Institute and the Columbia Planning 
Studio have helped New York City neighborhoods compile data and prepare 
community-based plans that emphasize localized interests and strengths. See 
generally THE MUNICIPAL ARTS SOCIETY OF NEW YORK, THE WILL TO PLAN: 
COMMUNITY INITIATED PLANNING IN NEW YORK CITY (Winter 1989-90), at 
20-28 (noting assistance given by these institutes to local residents, committees 
and advisory groups) (on file with author). 
148 See generally Handhart Interview, supra note 18 (commenting that 
efforts prior to contributions of technical assistance from the Pratt Institute 
were hindered by communication breakdowns). 
149 Id. (noting that no tangible results were reached by prior efforts); see 
also PROPOSED GREENPOINT 197-A, supra note 109, at 8 (noting the history of 
Greenpoint’s planning process, including public forums and workshops, to 
explore options and opinions as to what participants wanted to see develop 
along Brooklyn’s waterfront but acknowledging that these efforts did not result 
in a formal 197-a plan for Greenpoint). 
150 The Steering Committee, formed with volunteer assistance from the 
Pratt Institute, held numerous meetings, three major public forums, two 
meetings with the business community and made presentations at open 
meetings of Community Board One. Id. at 8-13. These events were advertised 
via local newspapers and fliers printed in English, Spanish and Polish. Id. at 
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Committee circulated a copy of the proposed plan door-to-door, 
and a public forum was held to debate it.151 The forum attracted 
about 150 participants and, in general, “the group expressed a 
great deal of support” for the plan.152 In addition, two meetings 
with the business community and two presentations at 
Community Board meetings evinced virtually unanimous support 
for the plan.153 Greenpoint’s final proposed plan innovatively 
relies on mixed-use zoning and, rather than polarizing 
commercial and environmental concerns, the community created 
a plan that retains industry while monitoring and enforcing 
environmental standards.154 Community Board One voted to 
approve Greenpoint’s 197-a plan in 1998.155 The Department of 
                                                          
12. Follow-up workshops were also conducted with Hispanic and Polish 
groups in their native languages. Id. For a full chronology and description of 
these events, see id. at 8-13. 
151 See PROPOSED GREENPOINT 197-A, supra note 109, at 8, 12. Over 
9,000 copies of the “newspaper edition of the plan” were distributed 
throughout the neighborhood. Id. at 12. In essence this distributed “almost one 
copy per household to Greenpoint residents and businesses.” Id. at 8. The 
forum was held on June 24, 1998. Id. 
152 See id. at 12 (describing meetings with business leaders, public forums 
and the support expressed for the plan). 
153 Id. at 8; see also Telephone Interview with Ron Schiffman, Director, 
Pratt Institute of Community and Environmental Development, (Nov. 22, 
2000) [hereinafter Schiffman Interview] (explaining that the two dissenters to 
the plan were Williamsburg residents who felt that Greenpoint’s boundary 
should be extended to include them). 
154 See generally PROPOSED GREENPOINT 197-A, supra note 109, at 40-
60. The recommendations included in the proposed 197-a plan were intended 
to “dramatically enhance Greenpoint’s environment by providing ecological 
benefits to the neighborhood and by mitigating the impact of existing pollution 
in accordance with the spirit and intent of the New York Charter [which] calls 
for Fair Share Siting Criteria.” Id. at 40. The “Detailed Recommendations” 
of the plan “are meant to encourage public access to the waterfront, low-rise 
housing and commercial development while protecting Greenpoint’s 
environment and quality of life.” Id. at 43. The proposed plan calls for 
reduction of pollutants within the Charter’s criteria levels, decontamination of 
hazardous sites, improvements of water quality as well as rezoning for future 
commercial development. Id. at 43. 
155 See DEPARTMENT OF CITY PLANNING, GREENPOINT 197-A PLAN Part 
I, i (as modified and adopted by the City Planning Commission and the City 
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City Planning received the final plan on February 3, 1999.156 
Greenpoint’s 197-a Committee first met with city agencies on 
February 22, 1999.157 
At an August 23, 2000 public hearing on the Greenpoint plan, 
there were sixteen speakers in favor of the plan and none 
opposed.158 The plan was adopted on January 30, 2002, after 
considerable modification by the Department of City Planning.159 
Among the city’s positive modifications were the sections calling 
for “halting expansion of the Greenpoint marine transfer station 
beyond 2,215 tons per day, and reuse of the adjacent incinerator 
site for public events and environmentally friendly purposes.”160 
However, the city settled on terms that leave Greenpoint 
residents vulnerable to new industrial uses. While the Greenpoint 
community was lauded by the Department of City Planning for 
its “collaborative approach in developing a 197-a plan responsive 
to the concerns of Greenpoint’s residents and businesses and to 
                                                          
Council) (Spring 2002) [hereinafter ADOPTED GREENPOINT 197-A]. According 
to the background summary of the City Planning Commission’s final, adopted 
plan, the Board voted to approve the plan for agency review on October 14, 
1998. Id. 
156 Id. at Part I, 3 (noting that the plan was originally submitted on 
October 21, 1998 and, after revisions for formatting and “other deficiencies” 
were corrected, was submitted in revised format on February 3, 1999); See 
also PROPOSED GREENPOINT 197-A, supra note 109, at i (indicating date 
received by Central Intake Department of City Planning as February 3, 1999). 
157 For a comprehensive list of meetings with government agencies, see 
PROPOSED GREENPOINT 197-A, supra note 109, at 13. 
158 See ADOPTED GREENPOINT 197-A, supra note 155, at Part I, 6. This is 
a striking comparison to Vinegar Hill’s final public hearing, which evinced 
considerable opposition. See supra note 92 (noting the various dissenting 
speakers and viewpoints offered at public meetings pertaining to Vinegar 
Hill’s proposed rezoning). 
159 See generally ADOPTED GREENPOINT 197-A, supra note 155, at Part I, 
7-11. The adopted plan commends “the Board and its Waterfront Committee 
for their collaborative approach in developing a 197-a plan” but specifically 
declines to adopt provisions pertaining to the siting of waste management 
facilities and substantially modifies the proposed plan as it pertains to 
lessening adverse effectives of industry and waste management due to the 
“citywide implications” of these provisions. Id. at Part I, 7-9. 
160 Id. at Part I, 9. 
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the issues raised by city agencies affected by the plan,” the city 
nonetheless took many opportunities to weaken the outcome of 
such a process.161 For example, it extended a moratorium on 
sitings of waste transfer stations in Brooklyn’s Community 
District 1 only until the adoption of the Department of 
Sanitation’s (“DOS”) study of the city’s commercial waste 
stream.162 The city also delayed re-zoning until comprehensive 
city needs evaluations can be performed, leaving the waterfront 
zoned M3-1 for heavy manufacturing in the interim.163 
The present situation is chaotic as the community continues to 
organize against new industrial and commercial development.164 
New York City, while subject to a “fair share” requirement 
dictating that publicly owned works be evenly distributed, does 
not have guidelines in place for privately owned facilities.165 
                                                          
161 Id. at Part I, 9. 
162 Id. at Part I, 3. The adopted plan notes that “City Council approval of 
the NYC Solid Waste Management Plan Modification Plan on November 29, 
2000 was contingent upon DOS undertaking a comprehensive study of the 
city’s commercial waste stream. Id. at Part I, 9. In a separate agreement the 
administration placed a moratorium on permitting any new putrescible or 
nonputrescible waste transfer facilities in Brooklyn Community District One. 
Id. at Part I, 8. It is unclear how long this moratorium will remain in effect. 
163 Id. at Part I, 10. (recognizing rezoning requests in the proposed plan 
but specifically declining to adopt these provisions and opting to establish and 
“interagency task force to study the principle of high performance zoning on a 
citywide basis”). 
164 See Bowles, supra note 64, at 22. Bowles notes that “city planners 
have been conspicuous in their absence” in Greenpoint and “so far, city 
planning officials have resisted Greenpoint’s pleas for saner coexistence with 
industry.” Id. He further points out that “residents in industrial neighborhoods 
continue to stew amid a sea of M-3s—and increasingly, they are targeting 
manufacturing itself as the enemy.” Id. 
165 See 62 R.C.N.Y. App. A, Art. 3(a) (asserting that the “fair share” 
requirement mandates the city to consider neighborhood compatibility and 
character, cost-effectiveness, and compatibility with the mayor’s location 
criteria when making decisions); see also Ferrer v. Dinkins, 218 A.D.2d 89 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (arguing that exclusion of privately run facilities from 
the “fair share” provision “foster[s] neighborhood stability and revitalization 
by furthering the fair distribution among communities of City facilities”); 
Silver v. Dinkins, 601 N.Y.S.2d 366 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1993), aff’d 602 
N.Y.S.2d 540 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (holding that a proposed parking garage 
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Currently, Greenpoint faces the development of a private power 
plant.166 Thus, residents continue to organize and strategize, with 
little tangible reward for their hard-earned, inclusive land use 
decision-making process. 
V. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF NEIGHBORHOOD PLANNING 
EFFORTS 
An examination of the planning strategies and efforts of 
Vinegar Hill and Greenpoint points out certain factors that may 
influence the success of public participation. These can be broken 
down into three categories: community demographics, 
community access to resources, and the goals of proposed plans. 
To encourage more public participation and comprehensive 
planning, these factors should be addressed in a way that 
equalizes each community’s ability to influence land use 
decisions. Equal access to resources and, ideally, equal 
consideration by the City Planning Commission could provide 
fairer outcomes. Closer analysis of how each community 
proceeded helps to suggest how such a solution might be 
structured legislatively. 
                                                          
on Manhattan’s Lower East Side violated the “fair share” provision of the City 
Charter); Cmty. Planning Bd. No. 4 v. Homes for the Homeless, 600 
N.Y.S.2d 619 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1993) (holding that conversion of a dormitory 
into a shelter for the homeless pursuant to city financing did not violate the 
“fair share” provision of the City Charter because the provision does not apply 
to private facilities). 
166 Further details about the proposed 1,100 megawatt power plant on the 
Greenpoint/Williamasburg East River waterfront are available on the 
Greenport Waterfront Association for Parks & Planning (GWAPP) website, 
available at http://www.gwapp.org (last visited Oct. 25, 2002) (describing the 
proposal of the power plant as a “project [that] will have 300 foot 
smokestacks, spew well over a thousand tons per year of toxic emissions into 
our local environment, increase the area’s already hightened [sic] asthma 
levels and ruin New York City’s and New York State’s plans for parks and 
residential and commercial development on the Greenpoint/Williamsburg 
waterfront”); but see TransGas Energy Systems website, available at 
http://www.transgasenergy.com (last visited Nov. 12, 2002) (describing the 
proposal as “an environmentally responsible [project]. . . which meets all 
applicable regulatory standards”). 
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A. Demographics 
A community’s characteristics—size, homogeneity167 and 
location—play a large role in the probability of marshalling a 
community-sponsored plan through the proper administrative 
channels.168 As the above case studies illustrate, the smaller, 
more demographically homogenous community achieved 
rezoning rather easily, whereas the larger, more diverse 
community had greater difficulty. One possible explanation is 
that smaller, more homogenous groups may encounter fewer 
obstacles in organizing, identifying leadership and agreeing on 
the most beneficial use of its land because of its shared beliefs 
and values.169 
It is important to note, however, that the demographic 
homogeneity in Vinegar Hill does not end the inquiry because 
there was a sharp division between residents and businesses 
throughout the planning process.170 Although demographic 
                                                          
167 Homogeneity can refer to many socioeconomic indicators. Although 
the term may to refer to race or class, this paper points out that the term can 
be misleading because it does not adequately include different segments of a 
community. For example, a person can interact within the community as a 
resident, a business owner, a worker, or some other combination of these 
categories. 
168 This phenomenon is due, generally, to the acknowledged difficulties in 
collective action and organization of groups with varying interests as well as 
language barriers within a community. See, e.g., supra Part IV (comparing 
the barriers to collective action confronted by Vinegar Hill and Greenpoint in 
the planning process). 
169 See, e.g., M.P. BAUMGARTNER, THE MORAL ORDER OF A SUBURB 
(1988) (noting that sociological studies in dispute resolution have considered 
homogeneity a beneficial factor to consensus); see also Claus S. Fischer & 
Michael Hout, Differences Among Americans in Living Standards Across the 
Twentieth Century, The Survey Research Center, University of California, 
Berkeley (Aug. 2000) (unpublished manuscript available at http:// 
216.239.37.100/search?q=cache:i6zkKTnDTlcC:ucdata.berkeley.edu/rsfcens
us/papers/livingstandards.pdf+consensus+and+homogeniety&hl=en&ie=U
TF_8). 
170 Holt, supra note 85 (covering a community board meeting where 
“futility and confusion” was present as rezoning arguments continued, with 
the business community in opposition to any zoning changes). See also supra 
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statistics portray a small, affluent group of residents, workers and 
business owners whose interests may differ from residents 
brought conflicting visions of the neighborhood to land use 
decisions. It is exactly this tension that was not adequately 
addressed throughout Vinegar Hill’s rezoning process. In 
contrast, Greenpoint, a demographically diverse community, 
actually emerged as a cohesive voice.171 Its cooperative process 
resulted in a unanimously supported plan.172 The discrepancy 
between demographics and cohesion clouds the simple conclusion 
that Vinegar Hill had an easier time merely because its residents 
were more demographically homogeneous and Greenpoint 
encountered greater difficulty due to demographic diversity. 
Ironically, the results of these two case studies could be 
interpreted to discourage comprehensive community-sponsored 
planning and consensus building and instead encourage planning 
by small, elite groups of people without regard for their 
neighbors.173 The opposite needs to be true if New York City is 
                                                          
Part IV.A (illustrating the lack of unanimous support for proposed rezoning 
plans). 
171 Although ethnically diverse, Greenpoint has a larger percentage of 
residents within its workforce, thus lessening the tension between residents 
and businesses seen in Vinegar Hill. See supra Part IV (setting forth the 
demographics and respective workforce percentages of Greenpoint and 
Vinegar Hill). 
172 See PROPOSED GREENPOINT 197-A, supra note 109, at 12-13. 
In general, the group [at a public forum advertised with door-to-door 
copies of the plan] expressed a great deal of support for the document 
with the major issue being expansion of the boundaries of Greenpoint. 
This was resolved in part by including the remainder of the area in 
the Greenpoint postal zip-code. 
Id.; see also Schiffman Interview, supra note 153 (offering first-hand account 
of unanimous support at the later meetings); Telephone Interview with Said 
Ahmed, Brooklyn Office of the Department of City Planning, Nov. 8, 2000 
[hereinafter Ahmed Interview] [transcript on file with author] (offering opinion 
that the Greenpoint plan was strongly supported throughout the community). 
173 This conclusion could be drawn from the fact that Vinegar Hill’s 
relatively small group of residents effectively achieved rezoning without 
arriving at a unanimously approved plan whereas Greenpoint’s plan, which 
sought to incorporate input from all concerned constituents, was not adopted 
by the City Planning Commission. See, generally, supra Part IV (setting forth 
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to reinforce neighborhood pride, foster a communal sense of 
control and increase accountability in planning policies. In short, 
an equitable planning process respects all people affected by it. 
As difficult as such agreements may be to reach, consensus 
building should be the focal point of successful planning, 
regardless of the demographic homogeneity of the residents. 
Instead, it is important to ask what role demographics play in 
community planning. Demographically homogenous groups may 
organize more easily and thus have more time to devote to 
political lobbying.174 If this is the case, the community with more 
effective organization and leadership could be perceived by city 
agencies as more likely to take issues to the ballot box, thus 
subtly (and perhaps wrongly) convincing political representatives 
that the goals of the politically savvy group reflect those of the 
community as a whole. Even though there were diverse 
viewpoints in Vinegar Hill, the homogeneity of the residential 
community provided a unified base to pressure politicians and 
create an appearance of cohesion. More organizational power 
enables a group to devote time and energy to lobbying and 
negotiating with city government. It may be that, although a 
consensus was finally reached in Greenpoint, the decade-long 
process of consensus building actually detracted from its potential 
political impact.175 In this way, Greenpoint’s diverse population 
may have been an obstacle to effective political power. 
One way for the city to equalize communities’ abilities to 
successfully rezone is to address the organizational obstacles 
confronting New York’s neighborhoods. The Department of City 
Planning should assist diverse communities by encouraging 
                                                          
the processes of each community’s rezoning). 
174 It is self-evident that groups with few barriers to communication and 
collective action will not be required to devote substantial resources to 
ensuring inclusion of varying interests, whereas those composed of multiple 
enclaves will necessarily devote greater resources to communication between 
and amongst themselves, thus leaving fewer resources for garnering political 
support. See supra Part IV (comparing Vinegar Hill’s efforts with 
Greenpoint’s efforts to inform all concerned facets of the community). 
175 See Handhart Interview, supra note 18 (suggested that the potential 
impact of Greenpoint’s plan may have been hindered by the necessarily 
lengthy process of consensus building). 
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organization and cooperation. One possible solution is to 
strengthen the 197-a process by offering leadership assistance 
grants and consensus-building workshops sponsored by the city. 
This would bolster the organizational power of a diverse 
community like Greenpoint, freeing up time for developing the 
necessary political strategies and, eventually, increasing its 
chance of successfully rezoning. 
Location is another factor that may influence the city’s 
determination of where to expend its resources. The city could 
perceive that assisting Vinegar Hill by down-zoning the area 
might encourage high-end residential development and, in turn, 
increase the city’s tax base.176 Although it is only served by one 
subway stop, Vinegar Hill is close to Manhattan and downtown 
Brooklyn, and surrounded by neighborhoods that are becoming 
tourist destinations.177 Greenpoint, on the other hand, suffers 
from a lack of convenient transportation to Manhattan and 
Brooklyn’s commercial core, as well as a perception of isolation 
because of two waterway boundaries, one highway boundary, 
and a southern stretch of vacant warehouses.178 
                                                          
176 See Cindy Mindell-Wong, Zoning to Market, to Market: The Northeast 
Quadrant, ROCHESTER CITY NEWS, May 8, 2002, available at http://www. 
rochester_citynews.com/gbase/Gyrosite/Content?oid=oid%3A1203 (noting 
that down-zoning, which reduces the density or intensity of use of a property 
would lead to small streets of owner-occupied single family houses and higher 
property values). 
177 See supra Part IV.A (noting Vinegar Hill’s proximity to historical 
neighborhoods and other tourist attractions). 
178 See Gilbert, supra note 110, at 90. Land use and circulation may be 
mismatched if development overwhelms the available transportation systems or 
if the configuration and location of transportation facilities do not correspond 
with the needs of that area. See EDWARD J. KAISER, DAVID R. GODSCHALK, 
F. STUART CHAPIN JR., URBAN LAND USE PLANNING 230 (1995). Modern 
urban planners promote public transit and walking in an effort to reduce 
reliance on transportation by automobiles. See GERALD E. FRUG, CITY 
MAKING: BUILDING COMMUNITIES WITHOUT BUILDING WALLS at 151 (noting 
the importance of public transportation in “compact, walkable, multiuse 
neighborhoods [which are] built around transit stops”). Convenient and 
accessible transportation centers may even encourage residents to reside in a 
particular area. See Robert Cervero, Growing Smart by Linking Transportation 
and Urban Development, 19 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 357 (2000) (describing a San 
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Finally, the housing stock and average income of a 
neighborhood may determine the city’s perception of it as a good 
investment of planning resources.179 In Vinegar Hill, the rapid 
response of the Department of City Planning and the area’s 
development since the zoning change suggest that goals other 
than the stated desire to preserve the area’s residential streets 
may have played a large role in the successful rezoning.180 The 
                                                          
Francisco/Bay Area community where many residents “self-select to reside 
near transit nodes for the very purpose of economizing on commuting”). 
Considerations in community planning, however, must also be given to other 
forms of transit that promote efficient circulation. See KAISER, supra, at 376 
(describing a “multimodal” public transportation system that also incorporates 
taxicabs, bicycles, pedestrians, carpools and parking); see also Oliver A. 
Pollard III, Smart Growth and Sustainable Transportation: Can We Get There 
From Here?, 29 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 1529 (2002) (asserting that community 
growth will be difficult to achieve without more sustainable transportation 
approaches and, likewise, significant transportation improvements will be 
difficult to achieve without more sensible development practices). 
179 Scholars argue that municipality residents that do not live in 
exclusively residential districts, but in mixed-use districts are usually less 
affluent apartment dwellers whereas municipality residents in exclusively 
residential districts are usually owners of detached dwellings. See, e.g., Joel 
Kosman, Toward an Inclusionary Jurisprudence: A Reconceptualization of 
Zoning, 43 CATH. U. L. REV. 59 (1993). Hence, the “desirable citizen” in 
purely residential districts is one that can afford his own home, and those who 
cannot are forced to live in mixed use districts. Id. at 84. Others argue that 
land use development in the absence of zoning is usually orderly and many 
uses will locate in the same place whether zoning is in effect or not. See, e.g., 
Bernard H. Siegan, Non-zoning is the Best Zoning, 31 CAL. W. L. REV. 127 
(1994). Siegan argues that, “[f]or those who are economically better off, 
zoning is a luxury. In its absence, reasonable protection of their urban 
environment can be accomplished by imposing and enforcing restrictive 
covenants and a limited number of laws.” Id. at 139. Siegan delivered a series 
of speeches urging voters to reject zoning and a proposed zoning ordinance in 
Houston, Texas and suggested that instead of forced zoning, the “city should 
make every effort to preserve and enforce deed restrictions.” Id. 
180 See Brozan, supra note 105 (discussing real estate plans by developer 
David C. Walentas, who has owned large chunks of land in the area and has 
worked to revitalize the community); See generally, Patrick J. Skelley, Public 
Participation in Brownfield Remediation Systems: Putting the Community Back 
on the (Zoning) Map, 8 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. J. 389, 406-12 (1997). Skelly 
notes that “governmental bodies are presumably equipped to determine not 
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city was likely interested in encouraging high-end residential 
development and the retail-entertainment facilities that usually 
follow such development in this section of Brooklyn.181 This sort 
of development benefits both the city and the borough by drawing 
tourism and upper-middle class residents to the area. 
Neighborhood revitalization is attractive to Vinegar Hill residents 
as well because of the services that follow such as more 
transportation, stores, theaters and restaurants.182 Because 
organized residents of Vinegar Hill are predominantly 
homeowners, the increase in services could outweigh fears of 
increased rents.183 In real estate lingo, location is everything—
                                                          
only whether a property owner’s use of land is appropriate in reference to 
neighboring uses, but whether such a use accords with regional needs and 
concerns, given a zoning entity’s familiarity with master plans and other 
comprehensive planning techniques.” Id. at 411. According to Skelley, zoning 
can also “be carried out to best promote the public health, safety, and general 
welfare.” Id. 
181 See Bowles, supra note 64, at 23. Bowles explains that the city’s 
housing crisis brought many young professionals to the borough of Brooklyn, 
and these newer residents “favor[ed] new housing, shops and amenities.” Id. 
Furthermore, residents living in or near areas that had been zoned for heavy 
manufacturing “have been aggressively pushing city officials to rezone large 
swaths of those areas for residential use, usually with local political support. 
[Additionally,] [m]ounting political pressure from votes . . . is likely to keep 
the political momentum going.” Id. 
182 See Brozan, supra note 105 (quoting local developer David Walentas 
as saying of the area, “[a] year ago, there was no retail in the neighborhood. 
Now we have a Korean market, a chocolatier, antiques shops, art galleries.”). 
183 Homeowners with steady incomes will only be removed from their 
homes through eminent domain, which requires just compensation, or if 
property values increase so much as to make property taxes unaffordable to 
them. In contrast, renters can be forced to move due to rent increases. See 
David B. Fein, Historic Districts: Preserving City Neighborhoods for the 
Privileged, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 64 (1985). Fein notes that renters are more 
vulnerable residents because “[l]andlords may evict their tenants directly or 
may sell their buildings to people who will convert them to single-family use. 
Additionally, rehabilitation may lead to steep rent increases, which in turn 
may force low-income tenants to leave their homes.” Id. at 85. He further 
states that “[l]ow-income homeowners . . . may also be displaced by 
gentrification.” Id.; Ray Telles, Comment: Forgotten Voices: Gentrification 
and Its Victims, 3 SCHOLAR 115 (2000). Telles notes that “when the upper-
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Vinegar Hill was in the right place at the right time, and in 
economic terms, its plan was efficient. 
B. Access to Resources 
While the city may look to a community’s income as a factor 
related to development incentives and overall economic promise, 
a community’s financial status is also a tool to gain access to 
resources including time, money and technical assistance. This is 
essential to a successful planning process.184 Without adequate 
resources, there is little chance that public participation will 
affect decisions in a meaningful way. As these two studies reveal, 
the fact that Vinegar Hill had an easier time rezoning than 
Greenpoint was due in part to the city’s direct assistance. 
The City Planning Commission donated time and energy to 
Vinegar Hill by conducting a zoning study of the area and 
                                                          
income inhabitants, instead of building new homes, relocate to the older 
neighborhoods previously lived in by lower income groups . . . new money is 
spent in renovation and repair.” Id. at 131. Once large scale renovation 
begins, with “more and more money being pumped into these older 
neighborhoods, property taxes increase. With increased property taxes, 
landowners find justification for increased rents. Accordingly, the few 
remaining low-income residents are displaced by skyrocketing rents, which are 
paid by incoming upper-income tenants.” Id. 
184 See MAS, STATE OF 197-A PLANNING, supra note 26, at 9 (noting the 
amounts of funding and time required to develop a successful community 
zoning plan). Access to financial resources is required for towns undertaking 
any significant new construction. See NEW TOWNS SYMPOSIUM in JAMES A, 
LYONS JR. ET AL., NEW TOWNS AND PLANNED COMMUNITIES 243 (1971) 
(noting that constructing a town within the span of a few years raises financial 
problems not ordinarily faced by other towns which develop more slowly); 
JANE JACOBS, THE ECONOMY OF CITIES 122 (1969) (asserting that the 
problems of growing cities are only solved by new goods and services that 
increase economic abundance). Because zoning and environmental clean-up 
also involves scientific research and technological prowess, access to resources 
is also necessary to facilitate community understanding of the process and 
available information. See generally Spyke, supra note 3, at 293-95 (noting 
that environmental clean-up and rezoning “necessitates the compilation of 
enormous amounts of data” and that “participation programs demand large 
amounts of time, are difficult to manage”). 
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proposing the zoning changes itself at the community’s request.185 
This assistance eliminated many potential pitfalls for the Vinegar 
Hill community, including financial and technical hindrances. In 
contrast, Greenpoint did its planning work without assistance 
from the city.186 Financial constraints played a role in working 
through the different viewpoints because everyone participated on 
a volunteer basis and, for most people, this meant after a long 
day of work.187 Such constraints slowed Greenpoint’s progress 
and detracted from the amount of time available for political 
lobbying and dialogue.188 Although it is admittedly unfeasible for 
the Department of City Planning to conduct zoning studies of 
every area requested, the city could provide grants or allow 
communities to apply for extra financial assistance.189 Financial 
aid could remedy the disparity between communities with access 
                                                          
185 See generally CITY PLANNING COMMISSION FINAL REPORT, supra note 
73 (indicating that city agencies conducted a zoning study and submitted 
proposals on behalf of the Vinegar Hill community); see also Bowles, supra 
note 64, at 21, 24 (surmising that Council member Ken Fisher’s help in 
gaining historic landmark status for the Vinegar Hill district was instrumental 
in rezoning the district as residential). 
186 See generally Schiffman Interview, supra note 153 (noting the lack of 
municipal contribution to Greenpoint’s planning process); Handhart Interview, 
supra note 18 (noting that Greenpoint residents and volunteer workers staffed 
many of the committees). Some commentators suggest that the city does not do 
enough to help industrial and commercial land users as well. See generally 
Jonathan Bowles, The Big Squeeze, CENTER FOR AN URBAN FUTURE, 
available at http://www.nycfuture.org/content/reports/report_view.cfm? 
repkey=54&area=realpol (May 1, 1999) (noting that a problem faced by 
industrial and commercial landusers is “the failure to develop the large supply 
of unused city-owned land” and that although the city possesses a substantial 
amount of land, “little has been done to encourage its redevelopment for 
industrial use.”). Id. 
187 See Handhart Interview, supra note 18. According to Handhart, even 
though all public participation is voluntary, there is an advantage to having 
one or two people take on full-time coordination and organization rather than 
requiring people to devote time to the process after they may have already 
completed a day of work at a full-time job. Id. 
188 See generally id. 
189 Funding could be made available to individual communities in the 
event that the city is unable to provide staffing for the actual work. 
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to funding and communities without such resources. This would 
also remove some of the city’s discretion as to which 
communities were economically desirable for rezoning, and 
lessen the impact of economic considerations and disparity in 
land use decision making. 
Vinegar Hill also benefited from the city’s technical 
assistance.190 The fact that the Department of City Planning used 
its expertise to study the area and propose zoning changes 
relieved residents from struggling with the complications of 
environmental impact studies, statistical analysis and complex 
legal issues.191 Greenpoint, on the other hand, had to locate its 
own assistance. Over the years, local universities offered aid for 
Greenpoint’s planning efforts but, because of the temporary 
nature of student research projects, this assistance was often 
incremental.192 Lack of technical assistance exacerbated 
                                                          
190 See NYC ZONING STUDY, VINEGAR HILL, supra note 56 (noting that 
the city conducted zoning studies of the area, and such work was not 
undertaken at the community’s expense). See also Angotti, supra note 25 
(discussing the difficulty of obtaining approval of a district’s 197-a plan 
without technical assistance from the City Planning Commission); Bowles, 
supra note 64 (suggesting that Vinegar Hill’s plan was approved over 
proposals from other districts because “they had the politicians’ ear”); Bill 
Farrell, Vinegar Hill Eyes Future Decisions on Zoning, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, 
Nov. 24, 1997, at 1997 WL 16053356 (describing certain rezoning proposals 
by the City Planning Commission). 
191 See generally NYC ZONING STUDY, VINEGAR HILL, supra note 56 
(including background information about existing land use and zoning of the 
area, recommendations for rezoning parts of Vinegar Hill, and statistical data 
and charts analyzing and highlighting the findings of the study). See also 
Angotti, supra note 25 (noting that developing a 197-a proposal is often 
prohibitively time-consuming and costly to the district if it does not receive at 
least some technical assistance from the City Planning Commission); Bowles, 
supra note 64 (suggesting that a community must gain the support of the City 
Planning Commission before developing a proposal because the assistance of 
the City Planning Commission increases the probability of a plan being 
approved). 
192 See supra note 147 (noting the study completed by the Pratt Institute, 
which included an historical analysis, industrial and demographic profiles, a 
pilot real estate study, a telephone survey, an examination of zoning 
regulations and the impact of potential land use scenarios as well as a 
description of government programs affecting the neighborhood but pointing 
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organizational struggles, and the lack of consensus among 
Greenpoint residents frequently frustrated those trying to help in 
the early stages of the planning process.193 Greenpoint’s current 
197-a plan was drafted with the support and expertise of the Pratt 
Institute’s Center for Community and Economic Development, 
which provided the organizational and consensus building 
techniques necessary to synthesize competing visions.194 
The burdens of community planning are great, and the 
Department of City Planning has acknowledged the importance of 
such assistance in the past.195 Revisions to the City Charter in 
1989 attempted to lessen this burden by removing environmental 
impact assessments from the 197-a process and allowing 
community boards the freedom to hire planning consultants to 
assist with 197-a plans.196 Community Board requests to the 
                                                          
out that the plan did not achieve tangible results or effective re-zoning). See 
also supra note 150 (noting that Columbia University and the Pratt Institute 
have both offered volunteer services to communities seeking to re-zone or 
establish proposed 197-a plans). 
193 See Handhart Interview, supra note 18 (noting that, despite generous 
offers of assistance from institutes and community-based organizations, 
difficulties in communication and coalition building ultimately frustrated 
efforts and resulted in abandonment of start-up projects). 
194 See PROPOSED GREENPOINT 197-A, supra note 109, at 8 
(“Greenpoint’s 197-a plan was refined and completed over the past year with 
the technical assistance and resources from the Pratt Institute Center for 
Community and Environmental Development.”); see also Bowles, supra note 
64, at 25 (citing Ron Shiffman, director of the Pratt Intitute Center for 
Community and Environmental Development, as the author of the Greenpoint 
197-a plan). 
195 See MAS, STATE OF 197-A PLANNING, supra note 26, at 9 
(acknowledging the difficulties of coalescing multiple viewpoints and 
formulating community rezoning plans and noting the importance of 
government assistance in doing so). 
196 See supra note 30; see generally supra Part III (discussing 
amendments to the City Charter and the role of the ULURP in undertaking 
environmental review studies). Some commentators have suggested, however, 
that this effort has been ineffective or even detrimental to community planning 
and municipal intervention in the process of environmental review and 
compliance. See, e.g., Alan Breznick, Building in N.Y. Getting Even Harder, 
CRAIN’S N.Y. BUS., Jan. 1, 1990, at 11 (noting that provisions in the City 
Charter attempt to impose some limits on environmental reviews, but arguing 
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Department of City Planning for financial assistance to pay 
consultants, however, have been ignored.197 
Comparing the case studies, Vinegar Hill received substantial 
assistance from the Department of City Planning while 
Greenpoint received little. Without equal access to assistance, 
communities like Greenpoint will remain at a disadvantage when 
it comes to community-sponsored planning. Equitable 
sponsorship of communities is necessary to foster community-
based 197-a plans from all communities, not just those that are 
effectively organized and politically savvy. 
C. Each Community’s Stated Goals 
The success of the Vinegar Hill plan may also have stemmed 
from the limited goals of its efforts. The Vinegar Hill study 
encompassed a few blocks that the plan proposed to preserve as a 
residential area.198 The destruction of the 135-year-old Roman 
                                                          
that complex state and federal environmental mandates beyond the city’s 
control will hinder the charter’s effectiveness); Alan Breznick, Effort to Speed 
Environmental Reviews, CRAIN’S N.Y. BUS., May 27, 1991, at 55 (citing real 
estate officials’ concerns that the role and authority of the Office of 
Environmental Coordination, established under the 1989 City Charter 
revisions, has not been defined clearly enough to allow the office to 
accomplish its goal of hastening environmental review); Thomas J. Lueck, 
Assessing New York’s Charter Change, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1989, at § 10, 1 
(quoting Kent Barwick, executive director of the Municipal Art Society, as 
stating the revisions to the City Charter “won’t make things worse” but noting 
that “[t]hey simply fail to make things better.”). 
197 See MAS, STATE OF 197-A PLANNING, supra note 26, at 10 (noting that 
requests to city agencies for financing and funding have gone unanswered). 
Community Boards continue to request funding from city agencies to review 
existing utilization and zoning requirements. See COMMUNITY DISTRICT 
NEEDS, supra note 46, at 21-22 (indicating that Community Board 1 
“support[s] the use of city funds to develop 197-a plans and urge[s] the City to 
implement the Charter mandate of providing additional funding for each 
Community Board to have a planner on staff.”). 
198 See CITY PLANNING COMMISSION FINAL REPORT, supra note 73, at 1 
(noting that “Vinegar Hill is an approximately eight block area” and that “the 
Department of City Planning is undertaking this zoning study to determine if it 
is appropriate to rezone areas within Vinegar Hill to a residential district”). 
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Catholic Church in the early 1990s by a waste treatment company 
was the main catalyst behind neighborhood organizing.199 That 
visible change made the residents fear that “the big and profitable 
business of garbage [would] rapidly destroy a small but beautiful 
area with great history.”200 The Department of City Planning 
                                                          
199 Waldman, supra note 63, at CY8 (explaining that the destruction of 
this church created fear among residents that the owners of the property would 
begin treating waste on the site, which was directly across the street from a 
row of historic houses); Choices Cover, VILLAGE VOICE, Sept. 8, 1998, at 64 
(noting that “with the destruction of the church, Vinegar Hill dug its heels into 
the ground and refused to budge”). 
 A strong reaction by one homogenous group to a particular action or 
siting decision, in this case the residents’ response to a waste treatment 
company moving in, is reminiscent of behavior known by the acronym 
NIMBY — “not in my backyard.” NIMBYism is a response seen when 
communities rally against a possible change in land use that is viewed as 
detrimental in some way. See generally Michael B. Gerrard, Fear and 
Loathing in the Siting of Hazardous Waste Facilities: A Comprehensive 
Approach to a Misperceived Crisis, 68 TUL. L. REV. 1047 (1994). Gerrand 
argues that “[a]lthough facility opposition is often trivialized with acronyms 
like NIMBY (“Not In My Backyard”), LULU (“Locally Undesirable Land 
Use”), or BANANA (“Build Absolutely Nothing Anywhere Near Anything”), 
even new, ‘state-of-the-art’ facilities pose real environmental hazards.” Id. at 
1054. NIMBYism is often invoked to prevent sitings of LULUs in particular 
neighborhoods. Id. 
 The race and class ramifications of NIMBY actions are noted in the 
response acronym, PIBBY—“put in black’s backyard.” For an enlightening 
review of these and other environmental concerns in contemporary society, see 
ROBERT D. BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE: RACE, CLASS, AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY (1990). The siting of an undesirable facility in a 
minority neighborhood is seen as an example of inequity in environmental 
protection. See also Alice Kaswan, Environmental Justice: Bridging the Gap 
Between Environmental Laws and “Justice,” 47 AM. U.L. REV. 221 (1997) 
(noting that environmental laws may reveal that a site was selected despite its 
failure to meet the necessary qualifications and citing that the role of 
environmental justice in pursuing political justice ought to be explored in 
connection with environmental justice disputes involving the siting of 
undesirable land uses). The appearance of NIMBYism in Vinegar Hill’s 
process warrants concern because the community is not being represented in 
its entirety. 
200 See Lentz, supra note 90, at 16 (detailing the nature of the dispute 
between local residents and business owners). 
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found those fears legitimate, and Commissioner Joseph Rose 
stated that the Department would “not do anything that has an 
adverse impact on the economic activity in the area, [b]ut [ ] 
[would] take action to prevent the area from being turned into a 
waste transfer focus.”201 
Greenpoint’s plan was also “a response to a series of ill-
considered public and private actions. From the late fifties to 
today public policies have led Greenpoint’s eastern sector to 
become a ‘dumping ground’ for burdensome facilities.”202 
However, Greenpoint’s plan differs from Vinegar Hill’s in many 
respects. Greenpoint’s plan encompasses a much larger area.203 
and calls for a re-evaluation of environmental standards, planned 
open space and more pedestrian-friendly streets.204 In contrast to 
                                                          
201 Id. 
202 See PROPOSED GREENPOINT 197-A, supra note 109, at 3. Cf., Michael 
Burger, NYC Issues 2001: The Environment, GOTHAM GAZETTE, at http:// 
www.gothamgazette.com/searchlight2001 (stating that New York City’s short-
term solutions for its environmental problems “saddles” low income 
neighborhoods like Greenpoint with power plants and waste transfer stations 
and as a result these neighborhoods shoulder the city’s pollution burdens); 
JANE SWEENEY ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL BENEFITS PROGRAM, The Mega-
Cities Project Publication MCP-018G, (1998) (asserting that Greenpoint 
suffers from severe environmental degradation as a result of its high 
concentration of industrial activity and the community’s position at the center 
of New York City’s waste disposal network). 
The community is host to: a large, antiquated incinerator burning 
garbage (including medical waste) from the entire city; numerous 
garbage “transfer stations,” often resulting in illegal dumping; and a 
massive waste water treatment plant, the Newtown Creek Water 
Pollution Control Plant (WPCP), which handles about 20% of the 
city’s waste water and has not been in compliance with state 
environmental regulations for years. 
Id. 
203 As noted, Vinegar Hill’s plan encompassed merely eight blocks. See 
NYC ZONING STUDY, VINEGAR HILL, supra note 56, at 1. Greenpoint’s plan, 
however, initially included fourteen census tracts and was later expanded to 
include an additional seventeen block area. See PROPOSED GREENPOINT 197-A, 
supra note 109, at 8. 
204 See id. at 38 (recommending economic, social, environmental, as well 
as quality of life improvements for Greenpoint). Recommendations included 
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Vinegar Hill’s call for down-zoning, Greenpoint seeks to remain 
a viable mixed-use district with a diverse residential population 
and cleaner industry.205 Greenpoint’s 197-a plan states that “[i]t is 
a plan to address the future of this community, to build upon its 
strengths, and to eliminate the impediments to the growth of a 
healthy and viable community.”206 The larger scope and the 
emphasis on mixed-use districts should be lauded as an 
innovative approach toward accepting and promoting responsible 
industry.207 Instead, the scope of Greenpoint’s plan may have 
                                                          
initiating a charter calling “for Fair Share Siting Criteria to be used as a 
guideline in locating city facilities” so as to prevent the community from 
expanding burdensome facilities, and developing “an aggressive and sustained 
greening program for Greenpoint.” Id. 
205 Id. at 20-22. The Greenpoint 197-a plan notes that planning involves 
providing job training for new young immigrants and developing community 
facilities such as schools and other educational institutions that respond to 
Greenpoint’s diverse population. Id. at 56, 57. It also includes building a new 
library that incorporates an expanded collection of books in foreign languages 
to meet the needs of Greenpoint’s diverse ethnic groups. Id. at 57. The plan 
also involves creating a centrally located space for local community groups, 
which would allow and further encourage the development of a cooperative 
spirit among diverse groups. Id. This space would also accommodate a harvest 
festival every summer to celebrate Greenpoint’s diversity. Id. 
206 Id. at 3. 
207 See PROPOSED GREENPOINT 197-A, supra note 109, at 20-22. The 
Greenpoint plan proposes mixed-use zones that would limit industrial 
expansion to businesses that enter into good neighbor agreements and 
demonstrate that they can meet strict environmental performance standards. 
Id. at 32. Performance-based standards are ceilings on the amount of pollution 
a given manufacturer can emit and permit manufacturers to choose how to 
meet the applicable standard. For a thorough explanation of this and other 
regulatory controls, see generally Jonathan Remy Nash, Too Much Market? 
Conflict between Tradable Pollution Allowances and the “Polluter Pays” 
Principle, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 465 (2000). Nash proposes that 
“[m]odern environmental regulations grow out of the understanding that, in 
their absence, manufacturers will externalize their costs and push them down 
the line to government or society-at-large.” Id. at 480. He states that 
“[r]egulations seek to avoid this undesirable result by forcing prospective 
polluters to take measures, at their cost, to reduce their pollution emissions to 
an acceptable level and pay for damages caused by residual pollution 
emissions that occur despite these measures.” Id. 
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stalled its progress. According to the Brooklyn Office of City 
Planning, the plan’s breadth most likely resulted in the City 
Planning Commission striking down many parts of the plan.208 
Others suggest however, that plain economic efficiency prevented 
implementation of the plan.209 
Arguably, the city has little economic incentive to approve a 
plan like Greenpoint’s. A pure cost-benefit analysis might reveal 
that such a plan is economically inefficient due to the 
administrative costs of restructuring the environmental standards, 
the costs of monitoring compliance, and the economic burden 
placed on industries’ production levels as a result of stricter 
standards.210 Others, however, might suggest that the plan is 
efficient in the long-term because it reduces environmental harm 
and may bring new residents and businesses to the area; thus the 
up-front costs of restructuring and monitoring are balanced by the 
                                                          
208 See Ahmed Interview, supra note 172 (suggesting that the scope of 
Greenpoint’s proposed re-zoning areas and overall sweep of the plan had 
deleterious effects on the agency’s acceptance of the provision as a whole); see 
also Bowles, supra note 64, at 24. According to those that have worked on the 
plan, the Office of City Planning has not embraced many of the community’s 
recommendations. Id. at 25. Officials have informed the community that the 
changes they are calling for are not in accordance with city regulations. Id. 
Planners have theorized “that the Commission is motivated by a desire to 
reserve potential sites for essential services that can’t be located outside the 
city.” Id. 
209 See Bowles, supra note 64, at 24. According to Bowles, some 
observers attributed the plan’s failure to “the agency’s coziness with real estate 
industry, which they say results in a bias toward zoning land for the most 
profitable uses possible.” Id. 
210 See, e.g., Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing “Environmental Justice”: The 
Distributional Effects of Environmental Protection, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 787, 
793 (1992) (noting that “environmental protection requires governmental 
expenditures, the source of which varies from general personal and corporate 
income taxes to special environmental taxes. These expenditures necessarily 
decrease public monies available for other social welfare programs”); see also 
Wallace E. Oates, Symposium, Innovations in Environmental Policy: From 
Research to Policy: The Case of Environmental Economics, 2000 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 135, 149 (2000) (noting the difficulty of placing monetary values on 
benefits, such as improved health and extended longevity, that result from 
reduced air pollution). 
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future benefit.211 Participation theory advocates would support 
Greenpoint’s plan because of the value of the consensus-building 
process itself in empowering communities and encouraging 
leadership.212 Thus, whether decision makers should be guided by 
an economic model or public participation model becomes an 
important question. 
D. Conclusions Drawn from the Case Studies 
Community demographics; access to technical, financial and 
political resources; and the development and economic needs of 
the city are all at play when a community seeks to organize and 
influence land use decisions. The case studies present two 
narratives that illustrate the disparate effects of the current 
decision-making scheme. While it is fair to allow the city a 
degree of input into community-sponsored plans to ensure that 
citywide agendas are not undermined, something more than 
economic analysis must guide the decisions of the Department of 
City Planning. Without an emphasis on public participation and 
inclusive decision making, there are no mechanisms in place to 
ensure that the Department of City Planning is accountable to 
disadvantaged communities whose interests may differ from those 
                                                          
211 Cf. NICK HANLEY ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS IN THEORY 
AND PRACTICE 29 (1997). Other overlapping rationales that explain 
environmental problems include the Coase theorem (arguing that the failure or 
inability of institutions to establish well-defined property rights results in lack 
of economic incentives to prevent environmental degradation); “tragedy of the 
common” (arguing that when it is impossible or costly to deny access to an 
environmental resource, the preservation/conservation of the common 
resource is likely to be ignored); and Samuelson’s public goods theory 
(arguing that since everyone benefits from the services provided by a pure 
public good such as clean air, it is easy for a “free rider” to enjoy the benefits 
without paying for them). See generally id. at 22-57. 
212 See, e.g., Spyke, supra note 3, at 271. Spyke notes that “although it 
may be true that the primary goal of some individuals is to convince 
decisionmakers to accept their solution to a problem, a secondary goal is to 
create feelings of self-confidence and shared control of government.” Id. 
Thus, the participation in the process is itself empowering and affords “a sense 
of control over one’s life and a feeling of political efficacy can also lead 
individuals to perceive the decisionmaking process as more democratic.” Id. 
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of the city at large. 
VI. TOWARD A NEW SOLUTION 
The first step towards infusing land use decision-making 
processes with meaningful and inclusive public participation is to 
favor comprehensive plans, like the two examined above, over ad 
hoc zoning.213 The idea of comprehensive planning has long been 
considered integral to the idea of zoning and, within the province 
of state and local governments, as responsive to community 
needs.214 The Department of Commerce’s Standard Zoning 
Enabling Act (“SZEA”) of 1922 required that land use decisions 
be made “in accordance with a general plan.”215 Soon after the 
                                                          
213 See NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF CITY PLANNING, 197-A PLAN 
TECHNICAL GUIDE 7 (1997). The Technical Guide suggests that the 197-a 
process will work and be effective over time if the community offers its 
consensus on the principles that should guide future land use. Id. Those 
principles will in turn serve as a guide for the agencies and individuals in 
decision-making positions about the neighborhood. Id. Furthermore, the 
strong community support will convince those decision makers that the actions 
proposed by the community are necessary. Id. at 8. 
214 See, e.g., Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. 365 (1926). Euclid 
involved a challenge to the comprehensive plan for the Village of Euclid, Ohio 
that regulated and restricted the location, size, and height of the companies, 
industries, apartment buildings, two-family houses, and single-family houses. 
Id. at 380. An owner of unimproved land within the corporate limits of the 
village, sought the relief upon the ground that, because of the building 
restrictions imposed, the ordinance operated to reduce the normal value of his 
property, and to deprive him of liberty and property without due process of 
law. Id. at 383-84. The Court noted that: 
 [i]f the municipal council deemed any of the reasons which have been 
suggested, or any other substantial reason, a sufficient reason for 
adopting the ordinance in question, it is not the province of the courts 
to take issue with the council. We have nothing to do with the 
question of the wisdom or good policy of municipal ordinances. If 
they are not satisfying to a majority of the citizens, their recourse is 
to the ballot—not the courts. 
Id. at 393, quoting State v. City of New Orleans, 97 So. 440 (La. 1923). 
215 See Standard State Zoning Enabling Act (U.S. Dep’t of Commerce 
rev. ed. 1926), reprinted in Model Land Dev. Code app. A at 210-21 (Ten. 
Draft No. 1, 1968); see also Carol M. Rose, Planning and Dealing: 
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SZEA was enacted, general plans were deemed inflexible and 
disruptive to growth.216 “Wait and see” zoning developed as a 
reaction to the limits of comprehensive plans.217 Courts have not 
consistently expressed a preference for one form over the other. 
Indeed, at least one state court went so far as to practically 
endorse “wait and see zoning,”218 while other courts have tended 
to treat individual rezoning requests with less deference, instead 
upholding the primacy of the general plan.219 Nevertheless, a lack 
                                                          
Piecemeal Land Controls as Problem of Local Legitimacy, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 
839 (1983) [hereinafter Rose, Planning and Dealing]. Rose notes that: 
 [t]he planning idea is not new, although it has only recently been 
taken seriously. In fact, the preference for ‘structured’ land decisions 
harks back to one of the oldest methods of assuring both fairness and 
due consideration in local land use regulation. The Department of 
Commerce’s Standard Zoning Enabling Act (SZEA), first published 
in 1922 and adopted by most states over the next few years, required 
that local land use controls be “in accordance with” a general plan. 
Id. at 848. A general plan developed by each community considers its own 
locally defined goals and is then utilized to direct and guide future decisions 
affecting land use within that community. Id. 
216 See, e.g., Lon L. Fuller, Freedom—A Suggested Analysis, 68 HARV. 
L. REV. 1305 (1955). Fuller offers narratives that explain the inflexibility 
inherent in the government planning of economic activity. Id. at 1325. One 
example is the planning of a road. Id. He claims that, while planning the road 
in advance would be beneficial in some respects, such as the the ability to 
bring in experts to devise the best route, it would also have drawbacks because 
the planning would not take into account future utilization of the road. Id. 
217 See, e.g., Edward J. Sullivan & Thomas G. Pelham, The Evolving 
Role of the Comprehensive Plan, 29 URB. LAW 363 (1997) (noting that ad hoc 
zoning, “affect[s] the land of the few without proper regard to the needs or 
design of the community as a whole”). The essential purpose of the 
requirement that rezoning be in accordance with a comprehensive plan is to 
guard against ad hoc zoning, or “wait and see” zoning, which allows for small 
parcels to be rezoned one at a time. Id. 
218 See Snyder v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 595 So.2d 65 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1991) (finding individual rezoning requests, essentially ad hoc piecemeal 
re-zoning, legislative in nature and thus subject to deferential review by the 
courts). 
219 See Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Snyder, 627 So. 2d 469 (Fla. 1993) 
(quashing a lower court finding that ad hoc zoning request should be given 
deferential review by courts). The problem with deferring to ad hoc zoning 
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of a comprehensive plan remains the norm.220 Such plans, 
especially when they result from an inclusive process, do more to 
foster public participation and simultaneously decrease the 
potential for corruption because of the diversity of opinions 
shaping the decisions.221 Some argue that ad hoc zoning, in 
constrast, is vulnerable to domination by factions.222 
Ad hoc zoning does include a degree of public participation, 
but this participation is more likely to be at the decision-making 
stage when developers are attempting to obtain variances or 
special use permits.223 At this point, public opposition to the 
                                                          
lies in the difficulty in determining what qualifies as an individual rezoning 
request as opposed to a comprehensive zoning plan. Id. at 471. The Florida 
Supreme Court overruled the deferential standard as it applied to individual 
rezoning, noting that “comprehensive rezonings affecting a large portion of 
the public are legislative in nature.” Id. at 474. The court emphasized that 
zoning decisions should be consistent with a legislatively sponsored 
comprehensive plan. Id. 
220 See Rose, Planning and Dealing, supra note 215, at 841 (noting that 
the variance, conditional use permit, and small-scale rezoning ordinance are 
“the everyday fare of local land regulations”); see also Daniel R. Mandelker, 
American Planning Association Growing Smart Project: The Growing Smart 
Legislative Guidebook, SH018 ALI-ABA 757 (2002) (describing the “wait and 
see” approach to zoning and stating “the process for obtaining [a] zone change 
and the discretionary permits is often a sequential, rather than a concurrent, 
one, and considerable negotiation and uncertainty [especially with neighboring 
property owners] occur at each step of the process”). 
221 See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON URBAN PROBLEMS, BUILDING THE 
AMERICAN CITY: DOUGLAS COMMISSION REPORT, H.R. DOC. NO. 91-34, at 
220 (1968) [hereinafter DOUGLAS]; see also Rose, Ancient Constitution, supra 
note 9, at 96-97 (citing the virtues of “possibilities for constituent contact and 
civic participation” in local government as “structural restraints” on political 
power); Fred P. Bosselman, The Impact of the Douglas Commission of Local 
Planning, C85 ALI-ABA 433, 471 (1993) (describing the “wait and see” 
technique as a promising device toward achieving harmony without monotony 
in small-scale relationships between blocks and neighborhoods). 
222 See, e.g., DOUGLAS, supra note 221, at 206-08 (discussing why the 
wait-and-see approach has replaced more self-executing regulations); see 
Rose, Ancient Constitution, supra note 9, at 855 (discussing the propensity for 
faction domination when a legislative body is drawn from too small or 
homogenous constituency). 
223 See Eric Bergman & Arthur Jacobson, Environmental Performance 
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rezoning is not economically efficient because it can result in 
delay or abandonment of a project in which developers and 
businesses are already invested.224 The form of inclusive 
participation that results in building consensus and empowering 
citizens directs attention to the process itself. Although Vinegar 
Hill’s process may seem like an example of successful public 
participation, it qualifies only insofar as residents are 
concerned.225 To be sure, public hearings are a form of public 
participation. It is troublesome, however, that the public hearings 
did not generate meaningful dialogue or affect the decision-
making process, because the strong opposition by area business 
was virtually ignored.226 Vinegar Hill’s process, though 
                                                          
Review: Self Regulation in Environmental Law, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 465 
(1994). In the course of an “environmental review process,” the lead agency 
initially determines whether the specific project sought to be pursued will have 
a substantial environmental impact. Id. The findings are presented to the 
agency and rigorous debate ensues among the related entities. Id. This phase 
of the process is not open to the public. Id. at 489. However, agency rules 
often require public participation with zoning variances and condemnation, in 
the course of which relevant environmental factors are often raised. Id. For 
further analysis of regulation of the zoning process, see Michel Gelobter, The 
Meaning of Urban Environmental Justice, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 841, 845 
(1994) (discussing how both urban and rural areas have rules to regulate the 
balancing of exchange and use values of land, but cities have many more rules 
that factor into weighing these values, including public participation in 
variances to them). 
224 See JOHN VRANICAR, STREAMLINING LAND USE REGULATION: A 
GUIDEBOOK FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 4-7 (1980) (considering problems with 
zoning systems, including that of “wait and see zoning,” zoning used to 
discourage homebuilding, delays and complicated rules for applications, and 
the turning of land use into a “lawyers’ game”). 
225 See supra Part IV.A (indicating that Vinegar Hill’s zoning process was 
largely a product of residential participation, at the exclusion and expense of 
commercial and industrial interests). 
226 See Lentz, supra note 90. Lentz notes that the plan to rezone Vinegar 
Hill has been met with displeasure by many of the industrial inhabitants of the 
area, because it overtly favors local homeowners. Id. The proposed zoning 
plan was initiated to protect residents from further industrial and commercial 
expansion. Id. The city’s plan seeks to prevent more waste treatment stations 
from occupying Vinegar Hill to ameliorate some of the concerns of its 
residents. Id. Conversely, local commercial entities fear this plan will hinder 
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successful in some respects, is reminiscent of a more 
individualized rezoning request and not a model for consensus 
building. 
In contrast, consensus building was one of the main visions of 
Greenpoint’s plan: 
The Greenpoint 197-a Plan identifies planning and 
development strategies that respond to the needs of the 
Greenpoint community and build on its assets. The 
Greenpoint Waterfront Committee, working together with 
local community groups and organizations, prepared the 
plan which reflects a consensus of different neighborhood 
interests. Through public forums, workshops, discussions, 
petitions, and local newspapers, collaboration between 
community-based groups, merchants, residents, 
manufacturers, new and old immigrants, and the young 
and the old began to revitalize the community by means of 
this local planning process.227 
Evidence of an inclusive process is found in the unanimous 
consent for the plan from all groups: industry, businesses, 
homeowners and renters.228 The ultimate unanimity does not 
indicate that the process was easy. Rather, it highlights the 
important work that is done when all affected groups come 
together to determine the optimal usage for land in their 
neighborhoods.229 Such consensus building is much more likely to 
                                                          
future business growth and eventually force them out of the community. Id. 
Currently, Vinegar Hill is zoned for manufacturing, with a majority of the 
homes listed as nonconforming uses. Id. The proposal would effectively 
rezone the area to make it predominately residential. Id.  
227 PROPOSED GREENPOINT 197-A, supra note 109, at 6. 
228 See supra note 172 (quoting the plan’s assertions, as well as first-hand 
accounts, of unanimity); see also Dennis Hamill, Writer’s a Fighter for 
Greenpoint, DAILY NEWS, Mar. 26, 2000, at 8 (detailing the activism of 
members of the Greenpoint community in forming the Greenpoint 197-a 
Waterfront Committee and suggesting reasons why these groups approved the 
Greenpoint Plan). 
229 See, e.g., Lynn E. Blais, Environmental Racism Reconsidered, 75 
N.C. L. REV. 75 (1996). A more inclusive process for land use decisions is 
recommended if a community’s process for comparing risks and benefits fails 
to capture all of the considerations believed to be relevant to its residents. Id. 
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occur when the entire neighborhood is at issue rather than 
through piecemeal “wait and see” zoning.230 
The result of Greenpoint’s consensus building was an 
innovation proposal for mixed-use zoning which holds industry to 
performance-based standards.231 The plan rejects the notion that 
industry is categorically inconsistent with environmental health.232 
Instead of exacerbating the divide between jobs and the 
environment or residents and industry, the Greenpoint 
community took responsibility for its industrial sites, recognized 
the large portion of residents whose livelihood depended on that 
industry, and incorporated industry’s needs into the plan.233 
The mixed-use zones proposed by the Greenpoint plan are to 
be preceded by performance-based standards that are meant to 
“guarantee that any enterprise that locates or functions in 
Greenpoint meets the highest environmental standards and 
                                                          
at 104. 
230 See Rose, Planning and Dealing, supra note 215, at 841-42 (noting 
that piecemeal changes appear to have little effect outside the individual 
developer and the property’s neighbors, but that the effects have a significant 
“cumulative effect”). See also Spyke, supra note 3, at 296 (noting that 
“piecemeal enactment of federal laws has left the nation with a patchwork 
quilt of legislation.”). 
231 See PROPOSED GREENPOINT 197-A, supra note 109 (discussing how 
collaboration between community-based groups, merchants, residents, 
manufacturers, and people of different demographic groups, relying upon 
public forums, workshops, petitions, and advertisements in local newspapers, 
resulted in a decade of planning and developing strategies to respond to the 
needs of the entire Greenpoint community through communication, 
negotiation, and eventually consensus). 
232 Id. at 32. The plan promotes industrial development while 
simultaneously initiating conservationist and other environmental programs 
that work in conjunction with the new development. Id. The plan advocates 
“sustainable development,” defined as development that “maintains or 
enhances economic opportunity and community well-being while protecting 
and restoring the resource base and the life support systems upon which people 
and economies depend.” Id. This sustainability plan includes “integration of 
conservation and development efforts” and “maintaining ecological integrity.” 
Id. One example proposed in the plan is the promotion of tree planting, park 
creation, and the regreening of industrial zones. Id. 
233 Id. at 35. 
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contributes to improving the area’s quality of life.”234 The 
community would use tools like mandatory demonstration of 
ability to comply and good-neighbor agreements to implement 
such standards.235 Under this model, mixed-use zones become 
opportunities for both business and residential expansion, while 
at the same time bringing conversions and nonconforming uses 
into conformance. 
Greenpoint’s process provides an excellent example of an 
innovative plan that reflects the needs of all members of the 
community. Reliance on mixed-use districts breathes new life 
into abandoned manufacturing zones along Brooklyn’s 
waterfront, and simultaneously retains the businesses and 
industry that are vital to many of the working class residents. The 
plan also encourages future compromise between residents and 
industry by performance standards developed in conjunction with 
good neighbor agreements.236 Instead of forcing out less desirable 
industry, it creates innovative monitoring stations in conjunction 
with the New York City Department of Environmental 
Protection.237 The monitoring stations would educate the public 
about environmental effects of the industry while measuring air 
and water quality to ensure compliance with existing 
regulations.238 Additionally, the plan provides for commercial 
                                                          
234 Id. at 32. 
235 Id. Mandatory demonstration of ability and the Good Neighbor 
Agreements Program would guarantee community oversight of local industries 
in order to increase the performance standards at which local industries 
operate. Id. 
236 These standards would of course have to allow for reasonable 
industry, so that the compromise does not disappear into the details. See 
PROPOSED GREENPOINT 197-A, supra note 109, at 56 (noting that the plan 
seeks to promote residential and economic development while protecting 
Greenpoint’s ecological balance). 
237 PROPOSED GREENPOINT 197-A, supra note 109, at 42. In order to 
protect the residents and workers from environmental hazards, the Greenpoint 
plan proposes the use of environmental monitoring and education stations. 
These stations will be accessible to the public and located throughout the 
Greenpoint community. Id. Moreover, these stations will monitor air, water, 
and noise pollution in Greenpoint. Id. 
238 Id. at 42. Monitoring systems would be in place to enforce the cleanup 
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development while retaining a mix of both market rate and 
affordable housing units in an effort to satisfy both landlords and 
renters worried about gentrification.239 
Nevertheless, the City Planning Commission’s response to 
Greenpoint’s plan focused inordinately on economic 
repercussions for the city and what the city’s role and expenses 
would be in implementing aspects of the plan.240 The Commission 
seemed most concerned about the aspects of the plan that could 
inhibit future industrial sitings in the neighborhood.241 This 
response reflects an economic approach to decision making and 
indicates reliance on a short-term cost-benefit analysis rather than 
a long-term approach that would recognize the benefits inherent 
in a participatory process.242 Such a response undermines the 
importance of the planning process, and instead removes the 
                                                          
of the Mobil Oil Spill, develop an aggressive and sustained greening program, 
enforce existing air pollution controls, and enforce existing regulatory rules 
for currently polluting industries. Id. 
239 Id. at 33; Handhart Interview, supra note 18 (discussing the need to 
account for the demands and fiscal realities of landlords as well as renters). 
240 Handhart Interview, supra note 18. Other questions included where 
the waste would be deposited and to what extent the city policy would alter 
concerning the effective zoning regulations. Id. 
241 Id. The commission’s concerns about the inhibition of industrial 
development in the neighborhood appears unwarranted. Greenpoint’s 
manufacturing zones lie in close proximity to its residential core. Id. 
Greenpoint desires to limit industrial expansion to those businesses that enter 
into “good neighbor agreements,” demonstrating that they can meet strict 
environmental performance standards. Id. An improved quality of life and 
healthy environment can generate future jobs. Id. The commission may also be 
concerned that the restrictions and regulations on traffic could deter 
development. Id. 
242 It should be noted that the Commission could have been concerned 
about the possibility of Greenpoint’s plan being rooted in NIMBYism, but this 
explanation is unlikely, given the presence of industrial sites included in the 
plan. See PROPOSED GREENPOINT 197-A, supra note 109, at 38 
(recommending, for example, that a plan “retain New town Creek as a 
‘Significant Maritime and Industrial Zone’ and an Industrial Sanctuary”). 
Also, the Commission made reference to no such concerns with respect to 
Vinegar Hill, which tends to show that something else is driving the 
Commission. See NYC ZONING STUDY, VINEGAR HILL, supra note 56 
(making no reference to NIMBYism). 
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people from their government. 
VII. PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE CHANGE 
Some planners and scholars have begun to think beyond 
short-term economics when it comes to planning decisions, 
providing models that can serve as guides to encourage 
development of neighborhood plans.243 One such example 
proposes creating community-building initiatives by combining 
public, private and community resources.244 For example, in 
Richmond, Virginia the Department of Community Development 
created a Division of Neighborhood Planning that “collaborates 
with residents, property owners, businesses, institutions and 
other city agencies to develop revitalization plans for specific 
neighborhoods that will serve as amendments to the City of 
Richmond Master Plan.”245 The City of Milwaukee, Wisconsin 
                                                          
243 One example uses private foundations as sponsors for comprehensive 
community planning initiatives. See, e.g., MUNICIPAL ART SOCIETY, THE 
WILL TO PLAN:COMMUNITY-INITIATED PLANNING IN NEW YORK CITY at 21 
(noting that in addition to the contributions of private organizations, individual 
experts often “helped the board prepare the plan for less by donating a great 
deal of their time”). A second model creates federally funded partnerships 
between universities and communities. See e.g. Federal Funding Available for 
Environmental Justice Issues in The Bronx, N.Y. VOICE, Aug. 16, 1995. The 
Community/University Environmental Justice Grant awarded $299,939. Id. 
The Hostos Community College provided matching funds, making the total 
grant $328,939. Id. 
244 See, e.g., MAS, STATE OF 197-A PLANNING, supra note 26, at 5 
(reviewing and outlining this proposed method for encouraging community 
participation). Examples of this method can be found in Richmond, Virginia, 
Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and Portland, Oregon.  
245 Id. at 7. There are several goals for housing and neighborhood 
development in Richmond, including: developing commercial and retail 
projects in designated areas to prevent encroachment into residential 
communities; building “cooperative relationships with city schools, 
community-based organizations, public facilities, and city government” to 
improve education, city image, and neighborhood vitality; and eliminating 
substandard housing while preserving architectural, historic, and cultural 
heritage. For a full review of Richmond’s city plan, including background 
information, goals and methods to include community input for housing and 
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uses Community Development Block Grant money to finance its 
Neighborhood Strategic Planning initiative that “serves as the 
mechanism for the development of comprehensive, community-
based, long-term strategic plans for 17 planning areas in the City 
of Milwaukee.”246 Drawing leadership from the communities, the 
Milwaukee initiative utilizes the city’s technical and financial 
resources in its inclusive planning process.247 Portland, Oregon 
uses a “Community and Neighborhood Planning Program” to 
update its comprehensive plan.248 This program divides the city 
                                                          
neighborhood development see City of Richmond’s Master Plan 2000-2020, 
available at http://www.richmondgov.com /ecitizen/documents/masterplan/ 
masterplan2001.asp (last visited Jan. 6, 2003). 
246 For a full review of Milwaukee’s efforts and goals in implementing 
this program, see generally City of Milwaukee Community Development 
Block Grant Program, available at http://www.ci.mil.wi.us/citygov/doa/ 
admin/cbga. htm (last visited Jan. 6, 2003) [hereinafter City of Milwaukee 
Website]. The Community Block Grant Administration “is responsible for 
applying for recommending the allocation of, and overseeing the effective use 
of approximately $30 million of federal funds or programs in targeted central 
city neighborhoods.” Id. “It is used for housing rehab programs, special 
economic development related to job and business development, and public 
service programs such as crime prevention, job training, housing for 
homeless, youth recreation programs and community organization programs.” 
Id. “The CDBG office works collaboratively with nonprofit groups, 
government agencies, and public/private coalitions to coordinate activity that 
increases home ownership and property values, reduces crime, and promotes 
greater employment and business activity.” Id. See also MAS, STATE OF 197-A 
PLANNING, supra note 26, at 7 (acknowledging the existence of this method of 
planning). 
247 See generally City of Milwaukee Website, supra note 246, for a 
discussion of the inclusive nature of Milwaukee’s procedures. Milwaukee’s 
Community Block Grant Administration “is responsible for applying for, 
recommending the allocation of, and overseeing the effective use of 
approximately $30 million of federal funds or programs in targeted central city 
neighborhoods.” Id. The office “works collaboratively with nonprofit groups, 
government agencies, and public/private coalitions to coordinate activity that 
increases home ownership and property values, reduces crime, and promotes 
greater employment and business activity.” Id. To date, the office has worked 
with community leaders to develop neighborhood strategic plans in seventeen 
neighborhood planning areas. Id. 
248 See generally City of Portland, Oregon, Bureau of Planning, available 
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into districts and encourages a participatory process in designing 
each district’s comprehensive community plan, focusing on both 
the neighborhood’s immediate and long-term goals as well as on-
going regional and citywide efforts.249 All of these programs 
encourage community involvement and help forge respectful 
relationships between city agencies and community groups. 
Although these programs are all relatively new, they indicate an 
interest in regulation directed toward encouraging, and 
sponsoring, comprehensive community planning. 
This article draws on administrative law doctrines to propose 
legislative reforms that would place public participation at the 
forefront of the land use decision-making process.250 This 
                                                          
at http://www.planning.ci.portland.or.us (last visited Jan. 6, 2003), for a 
comprehensive review of Portland’s planning process. The City Council 
adopted the Community and Neighborhood Planning Program in May, 1984 
“as the city’s approach to updating its Comprehensive Plan/Zoning Map.” Id. 
The goal of the program was to “create the opportunity for a more focused 
examination of Portland’s neighborhoods, business areas, industrial 
sanctuaries, and open space.” Id. Each community plan would address all 
Comprehensive Plan goals as well as other issues of significance to each of the 
plan areas. Id. To date, the city has adopted four community plans to update 
the city’s Comprehensive Plan. Id. 
249 See generally COMPREHENSIVE PLAN GOALS AND POLICIES, City of 
Portland, Oregon, Bureau of Planning, 12-16 (1999), available at http:// 
www.planning.ci.portland.or.us/pdf/ComprehensivePlan.pdf (last visited Jan. 
6, 2003) (describing how Portland’s Bureau of Planning staff held meetings 
with neighborhood associations, civic groups, and trade organizations to 
discuss their concerns, and revised the planning process to incorporate their 
concerns). Citizen involvement in land use planning is mandated in Oregon 
state. See also OREGON’S STATEWIDE PLANNING GOALS AND GUIDELINES: 
GOAL 1, OREGON DEP’T OF LAND CONSERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT 1, 
available at http://www.lcd.state.or.us/goalpdfs/goal01.pdf (last modified 
Nov. 1, 2002). 
250 See generally Federal Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-
552 (2003) (mandating that government agencies make available to the public 
information regarding organization, function, and overall activities). The 
purpose of Section 552, popularly known as the Freedom of Information Act, 
is to require agencies of the Federal Government to disclose certain agency 
information for public inspection and copying and to establish and enable 
enforcement of the right of any person to obtain access to the records of such 
agencies, subject to statutory exemptions, for any public or private purpose. 
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legislation should take the form of a modified deference rule.251 
The City Planning Commission would be required to defer to 
comprehensive community plans that demonstrate the inclusive 
nature of its process.252 This legislation would thus reward 
comprehensive plans formed by all members of a community 
through consensus-building techniques. 
A properly structured deference rule requires standards by 
which to gauge the amount of consensus building in a community 
planning process. This can be measured by efforts such as door-
to-door canvassing and distribution of planning materials, but 
also by examining the resulting proposed plan. For example, a 
mixed-use plan proposed by a community with substantial 
industrial and residential bases may be indicative of attempts at 
consensus building. The same could be said for a plan that retains 
a percentage of existing housing stock or requires multiple types 
of residential zoning to curb gentrification. All of these elements 
could be deemed evidence that a dialogue took place, and that the 
community’s voices were heard and accounted for. 
This reform would equalize the ability of all communities to 
influence decisions and temper the City Planning Commission’s 
discretion to decide such matters based solely on what is most 
efficient for the Commission and the city. It would also prevent 
administrative corruption and arbitrary decision making by 
creating an enforceable standard of review for 197-a plans.253 
                                                          
Id. 
251 The deference rule is commonly applied in the courts to administrative 
agency decisions. See, e.g., Consolation Nursing Home, Inc. v. Comm’r of 
N.Y. State Dep’t of Health, 648 N.E.2d 1326, 1328 (N.Y. 1995) (“An 
administrative agency’s exercise of its rule-making powers is accorded a high 
degree of judicial deference, especially when the agency acts in the area of its 
particular expertise”); N.Y. State Ass’n of Counties v. Axelrod, 577 N.E.2d 
16, 30 (N.Y. 1991) (stating that under the usual deference rule, the 
“challenger must establish that a regulation is so lacking in reason for its 
promulgation that it is essentially arbitrary”). 
252 An independent, preferably elected, body could conduct a review of 
each plan’s process to determine its inclusiveness. 
253 197-a plans are currently relegated to mere “policy guidelines” and no 
official standard of review is in place. See supra Part III (noting that 
amendments to the City Charter weakened the impact of community-sponsored 
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Legislative ratification of inclusive participation would create 
respectful working relationships between local governments and 
their constituents, encourage accountability and restore integrity 
to a democratic system. It would discourage exclusionary actions 
by rewarding communities that accept and integrate their fair 
share of essential industrial uses. This, in turn, improves 
community acceptance of essential, yet undesirable, land use by 
fostering self-determination in siting decisions, thereby reducing 
negative reactions to industrial land use. This article also 
advocates for provision of funding for community planning. 
Distribution of funds and resources remedies disparity in 
community attempts at planning by removing obstacles faced by 
low-income communities.254 Moreover, the city should be 
involved, financially and technically, with the community from 
the outset to encourage such consensus building. 
The 197-a process set forth in the City Charter should be 
amended to include this deference rule and funding allowance. 255 
Although such participation may be less efficient in the short-
term, the long-term effects of community consensus and 
empowerment will benefit the city by restoring legitimacy to its 
process.256 The reform’s emphasis on the process rather than the 
                                                          
197-a plans). 
254 See supra Part IV (discussing the adverse effects that disparity in 
access to financial and technical resources has had upon the relative success of 
the case study plans). 
255 See generally N.Y.C. Charter § 197-a (setting forth the current 
procedure for community-sponsored plans). 
256 This legislative amendment could counter some of the criticisms of the 
current 197-a process. For example, one weakness of 197-a plans is that they 
are not legally binding, and therefore can serve as nothing more than 
“references for decision making in a particular area.” See Jocelyn Chait, 
Community-based Planning: Moving Beyond the Rhetoric, at 
http://www.plannersnetwork.org/ htm/pub/archives/147/Chait.html (May/June 
2001) (noting that “[d]espite the fact that ‘197-a plans’ must go through 
exhaustive public review and scrutiny prior to their adoption by the City 
Council, they are not legally binding. At best, they serve as references for 
decision making in a particular area.”). Another criticism is that inadequate 
funding for plans leads to “inefficiencies and delays, strains the energy and 
resources of community residents, and ultimately leads to burnout and 
disillusionment.” Id. See also New York League of Conservation Voters, 197-
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result would provide an immediate reward for all communities 
that approach the planning process inclusively and openly. These 
reforms would most likely withstand judicial scrutiny.257 It would 
be difficult to challenge a policy of deference as arbitrary and 
capricious, in light of case law and statutes supporting land use 
decisions made “in accordance with a general plan.”258 
                                                          
a Needs Some 911, ECO POLITICS, available at http://www.nylcv.org/ 
ecopolitics/nyc.htm (Winter 2001-2002) (commenting on lack of funding or 
support for the plans and the inaction of agencies based on their view of the 
plans as impediments to Mayoral directives). 
257 The proposed amendment could draw on judicial standards of review 
applicable in cases examining compliance with public participation 
requirements under the Federal Administrative Procedure Act. See, e.g., 
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971). The 
Supreme Court set forth the standard of review in such cases as follows: 
The generally applicable standards of § 706 [of the Administrative 
Procedure Act] require the reviewing court to engage in a substantial 
inquiry. Certainly, the [agency’s] decision is entitled to a presumption 
of regularity. But that presumption is not to shield [the agency’s] 
action from a thorough, probing, in-depth review. The court is first 
required to decide whether the [agency] acted within the scope of [its] 
authority . . . Scrutiny of the facts does not end, however, with the 
determination that the [agency] acted within the scope of [its] 
statutory authority. Section 706(2)(A) requires a finding that the 
actual choice made was not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. To make this 
finding the court must consider whether the decision was based on a 
consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a 
clear error of judgment. Although this inquiry into the facts is to be 
searching and careful, the ultimate standard of review is a narrow 
one. The court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of 
the agency. The final inquiry is whether the [agency’s] action 
followed the necessary procedural requirements. Such a requirement 
would make it more likely that the amendment would be enforceable, 
and not merely another vague nod to public participation. 
Id. at 415-17. 
258 See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 
(1926) (validating a zoning ordinance based upon its comprehensive plan for 
the community); City of Renton v. Playtime Theatre, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1985) 
(holding a zoning ordinance to be valid since it was designed to promote the 
interests of the city); Wulfsohn v. Burden, 150 N.E. 120 (N.Y. 1925) 
(upholding a zoning regulation that promoted the general needs and values of 
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Furthermore, laws that encourage public participation in land use 
advance a legitimate governmental interest by restoring 
democracy and consistency to the decision-making process.259 
Because an adopted plan would remain a policy guide, the 
city would not be bound to the plan if implementation would have 
undue detrimental effects on neighboring communities or on the 
city as a whole.260 In the event that the city were to adopt 
neighboring 197-a plans that conflict at some future point, the 
city could retain authority to mediate and decide the best course 
of action after conducting public meetings to discuss mediation. 
Finally, if a community-sponsored plan were deemed 
exclusionary, it could be stricken. In short, a deference rule is 
just that—deferential. The city would remain in a position to 
rebut a presumption of deference to enforce equal protection 
considerations. 
CONCLUSION 
The 197-a process is a good starting point for democratizing 
land use decision making in New York City. However, as the 
case studies set forth above highlight, more effort must be 
expended to reward and encourage public participation. The City 
Planning Commission’s inconsistent review of 197-a plans 
indicates that some degree of reform is necessary. Public 
                                                          
the community). 
259 Many statutes evince a government interest in public participation. 
See, e.g., N.Y. TOWN LAW § 272-a(1) (McKinney 2003) (stating that public 
participation in the planning process promotes the most “optimum town 
comprehensive plan” for development); see also N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. 
LAW § 27-0101 (McKinney 2003) (stating that the legislative purpose is best 
met when the public has knowledge and provides consent). 
260 See e.g., Stanley D. Abrams, Flexible Zoning Techniques to Meet 
State and Local Growth Policies, 930 A.L.I. 537 (1994) (finding that flexible 
techniques in development plans are a more efficient way to meet the goals of 
community plans); Richard T. LeGates, The Emergence of Flexible Growth 
Management Systems in the San Francisco Bay Area, 24 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 
1035 (1991) (discussing the effect rapid community growth has on 
development plans and concluding the “tempo control” allows planning goals 
to be met most effectively). 
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participation and inclusive, consensus-building processes must be 
recognized as important elements of community planning. One 
way to recognize the importance of public participation in land 
use matters is for the city to make such participation more 
accessible by providing financial grants and planning workshops. 
Ultimately, however, an amendment to Section 197-a is the 
optimal method to mandate deference to plans developed through 
an inclusive community process. Such reform is the most 
effective means to encourage public participation and remove a 
degree of the City Planning Commission’s power to permit 
purely political or economic factors to control land use decision 
making. 
 
